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Abstract  
 
We revisit the link between crises and exchange rate regimes (ERR). Using a panel of 90 
developed and developing countries over the period 1980-2009, we find that corner ERR are 
not more prone to crises compared to intermediate ERR. This finding holds for different types 
of crises (banking, currency and debt), and is robust to a wide set of alternative specifications. 
Consequently, we clearly break down the traditional bipolar view: countries that aim at 
preventing crisis episodes should focus less on the choice of the ERR, and instead implement 
sound structural macroeconomic policies. 
 
Keywords: exchange rate regimes, economic crises, bipolar view 
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I. Introduction 
The choice of an exchange rate regime (ERR) has been so far the foremost battleground 
between the advocates of the exchange rate stability and those supporting the capacity of the 
exchange rate policy to handle real shocks. Up until the beginning of the 70s, a traditional 
view widely vehicled by the Bretton Woods monetary arrangements defended pegged regimes 
as the most workable exchange arrangement for promoting macroeconomic performance, 
including a low volatility of the exchange rate. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system and 
the emergence of several intermediate arrangements revived the issue relative to the choice of 
the appropriate ERR, all the more that the resurgence of crisis episodes revealed the 
vulnerability of hard pegs.1 As pointed out by Fisher (2001), the virulence of East Asia and 
Latin American crises shifted the balance toward the choice of more flexible exchange rate 
systems. In addition, the worldwide feature of the recent crisis, irrespective of countries’ 
ERR, tends to mitigate the vision relative to the safety of corner solutions compared to 
intermediated ERR, regarding the surge of crises. Consequently, one might reasonably ask if 
the choice of the ERR really matters for the incidence of crises, and moreover which ERR is 
more or less vulnerable to crises. 
Although these questions were tackled already, the existing contributions failed to 
reach a consensus on the vulnerability of alternative ERR to crises. On the one hand, a major 
strand of the literature (see below; see also Fisher, 2001, for a survey) argues that extreme 
(fixed or floating) regimes are disciplinary, while intermediate regimes are crisis-prone, i.e. 
the well-known bipolar view, establishing a formal link between the ERR and the probability 
of crisis. On the other hand, several influential papers, including Burnside et al., (2001, 2004), 
support that fixed regimes are, by construction, vulnerable to speculative attacks and 
particularly sensitive to banking and currency crises. 
Building upon this growing and controversial literature, our paper aims at exploring 
the choice of the appropriate ERR when it comes to gauging crises. First, we shed a fresh 
light on the stark controversy that plagues the literature relative to the crisis proneness of 
alternative ERR; to this end, we begin by contrasting the proponents and the critics of the 
bipolar view. Second, using a panel of developed and developing countries over the period 
1980-2009, we conduct a systematic analysis of the vulnerability of the three core ERR to 
                                                          
1
 The crisis episodes in Mexico (1994), Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea (1997), Russia and Brazil (1998), 
Ecuador (1999), and Turkey (2000), led to the perception that adjustable fixed exchange rate regimes are 
inherently fragile and crisis-prone (see, for example, Fischer 2001; Ghosh et al., 2002, Husain et al., 2005). In 
addition, following the collapse of Argentina’s Currency Board, the stability of hard pegs has been equally 
questioned (see, for example, Fisher, 2001). 
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different types of crises, namely banking, currency and debt crises, by properly accounting for 
different control variables for each type of crisis. 
Our results are the following. First, our baseline estimations show that intermediate 
ERR are not more vulnerable to banking or currency crises than pegged or floating regimes. 
Consequently, these findings clearly break down the bipolar view that intermediate regimes 
are systematically more vulnerable to banking or currency crises. Second, we explore, for the 
first time to the best of our knowledge, the proneness of alternative ERR to sovereign debt 
crises. Our findings do not emphasize a significant difference between corner and floating 
ERR in terms of their vulnerability to debt crises, contradicting, once again, the bipolar view. 
Third, we show that our results are robust to a wide set of tests, namely (i) when taking into 
account the contagion effects between crises, (ii) when splitting the sample according to the 
level of economic development or the time period; (iii) when performing estimations with 
alternative methods; (iv) when controlling for different variables or (v) when using alternative 
definitions for the ERR or (vi) alternative databases for the main variables, namely ERR and 
crises. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
literature on the link between ERR and crises surge, Section 3 presents the empirical strategy 
and the data, Section 4 emphasizes and discusses our main results, Section 5 performs a wide 
robustness analysis, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
II. Literature review 
The modern literature on crises experienced a particular development starting the 80’s, 
following several episodes of currency crises in Latin American and Asian economies. The 
abundant theoretical literature focusing on the determinants of currency crises (see the well-
known contributions of Krugman, 1979, Obstfeld, 1986, and Chang and Velasco, 2000, for 
first, second, and respectively third-generation models of currency crises) fuelled a more 
recent empirical literature illustrating a wider perspective of crises. 
 If we stick to the relation between the exchange rate regime (ERR) and the likelihood 
of crises, several authors, including Arteta and Eichengreen (2000), Aghion et al. (2001) or 
Stiglitz (2002) conclude to the absence of any effect of ERR on crises.2 Moreover, Esaka 
(2010a, b) and Asici (2011) do not establish a clear ranking of ERR, but instead assert that the 
                                                          
2
 According to these authors, crises have other determinants but the ERR, including, if we refer to banking 
crises, the rapid domestic credit growth, large bank liabilities relative to reserves and deposit rate decontrol. In 
addition, Haile and Pozo (2006) discuss the difference between de facto and de jure ERR for the surge of crises. 
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appropriateness of the chosen regime depends on structural characteristics of each country. 
Alternatively, an important strand of literature (see the upper part of Table 1) argues that 
corner solutions, which consist of pegging or floating, are less vulnerable to crises compared 
to intermediate ERR. 
 
 
Table 1: The literature on crises and ERR 
Authors Type of crisis Data features Results Analysis 
The proponents of the bipolar view 
Eichengreen et al. 
(1994) 
Speculative 
attacks 
1967-1992, 22 countries, 
mostly OECD IR are more prone to banking crises Empirical 
Domac and Peria 
(2000) 
Banking crisis 
with dummy 
1980-1997, developed 
and developing countries 
Fixed ER diminish the likelihood of 
crisis Empirical 
Mendis (2002) Banking crisis 
with crisis dummy Developing economies 
Flexible regimes reduce the likelihood 
of banking crises 
Theoretical 
Empirical 
Bubula and Otker 
Robe (2003) 
Currency crisis 
with EMPI 1990-2001 IR are more crisis prone Empirical 
Angkinand and 
Willet (2006) 
Banking crisis 
with dummy 1990-2003 
Soft peg and IR are associated with 
higher probabilities of financial crises Empirical 
The critics of the bipolar view 
Corsetti et al. 
(1998) 
Asian crises 
using crisis index  
Expectations of inflationary financing 
cause the collapse of the currency 
Theoretical 
Empirical 
Eichengreen and 
Hausman (1999)   
Pegged regimes are crisis-prone due to 
a moral hazard problem Theoretical 
Chang and 
Velasco (2000) Banking crisis  
Pegged regimes are more prone to 
banking crises. Flexible rates eliminate 
(bank) runs with appropriate policy 
Theoretical 
Fisher (2001) Currency crises 1991-1999, developed 
and emerging markets 
Softly-pegged ERR are crisis prone and 
not sustainable over the long period Theoretical 
Daniel (2001) Currency crises  Pegged regimes are inevitably crisis-prone due to unsustainable fiscal policy Theoretical 
Mc Kinnon 
(2002) Currency crisis 
Emerging market 
economies 
Floating regimes increase nations' 
vulnerability to currency crises through 
higher ER volatility 
Theoretical 
Burnside et al. 
(2004) 
Banking and 
Currency crises  
Government guarantees of the 
monetary regimes lead to self-fulfilling 
banking and currency crises 
Theoretical 
Rogoff (2005) Debt crises Developing Countries Rigid ERR or excessive borrowing lead to debt problems under any system Theoretical 
Note: ER stands for exchange rate and IR stands for intermediate regimes. 
 
 
However, this bipolar view was criticized by several papers, presented in the bottom part of 
Table 1. Overall, it seems that the existing literature has not yet provided clear-cut results 
regarding the eventual vulnerability to crises of alternative exchange rate regimes. 
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III. Empirical strategy and data 
We first present the econometric specification and then discuss the data used in our study. 
3.1. Econometric specification and estimation strategies 
To estimate the extent to which alternatives exchange rate regimes might be vulnerable to the 
occurrence of different types of crises, we adopt the following binary choice model 
ititittiit XERRCrisis εγβµα ++++= −− 11 ,      (1) 
where Crisis  is a dummy variable coded 1 if country i  experiences a crisis at time t  and 0 
otherwise. The interest variable is the exchange rate regime; since we aim at contrasting 
intermediate with extreme regimes, itERR  is defined as a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
country i  is under pegged or floating regime at time t  and 0 otherwise. According to the 
bipolar view, if intermediate regimes were more prone to crises, we should find a negative 
and significant effect of ERR. Finally, iα  and tµ  stand for country and time fixed effects, 
itX  is a vector of control variables (see below) and itε  is the error term. We rely upon logit 
models to estimate equation (1). To mitigate possible endogeneity problems, we explain the 
likelihood of crisis in the current period using lagged variables, including the ERR. 
3.2. Data 
Our study is conducted within a panel of 90 countries over the period 1980-2009, according to 
data availability. The time span is subdivided into ten periods of three years each and 
variables are three-year-averaged.3 To capture a crisis event, we built a dummy variable coded 
one if a given country experiences at least one crisis episode during the three years subperiod, 
and zero otherwise. The following subsections discuss extensively our main variables, namely 
the crisis and the ERR, and then present the set of control variables. 
3.2.1. Definition of crises 
To capture crisis episodes, we use the crisis database developed by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2011), combined with that of Leaven and Valencia (2012). According to these datasets, crisis 
episodes are defined as follows. First, banking crisis occur in two cases, namely when bank-
runs lead to closure, merging or takeover by public sector of one or more financial 
institutions, and when, although there are no runs, the closure, merging, takeover or large-
scale government assistance of an important financial institution marks the start of a string of 
                                                          
3
 The length of three years for our subperiods is consistent with the existent literature (see, for example, Frankel 
and Rose, 1996; Arteta and Eichengreen, 2000, Esaka 2010a,b, or Asici, 2011). The empirical literature often 
drops out the observations following a crisis episode to avoid the reverse causality problem. Since this method is 
not exempted from criticisms in the sense that dropping out observations can raise an attrition bias and alter 
conclusions, we refrain from using it in the paper. 
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similar outcome for other financial institutions. Second, a currency crisis refers to a situation 
where the depreciation (devaluation) of the local currency of a given country regarding the 
US dollar (the relevant anchor currency, e.g. historically the UK Pound, the French Franc or 
the Deutsch Mark) equals or exceeds 15%. Finally, we distinguish among external and 
domestic debt crisis. Regarding the former, a sovereign default is defined as the failure to 
meet principal or interest payments on the due date (or within the grace period), and also as 
episodes where rescheduling of debt is ultimately extinguished in less favorable terms than 
the original obligation. Regarding the definition of domestic debt crisis, Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2011) use roughly the same criteria, except that the debt holders are domestic; in addition, 
domestic debt crises involved the freezing of bank deposits and/or forcible conversions of 
such deposits from the US dollar to the local currency.4 
We illustrate in Figure 1 the distribution of different types of crises among different 
groups of countries. For generality, we use the World Bank’s country income level-based 
classification and distinguish among high income, including OECD, countries (HIC), upper 
middle income countries (UMIC) and low and lower middle income countries (LIC and 
LMIC respectively).5 LIC, LMIC and UMIC experienced all types of crisis, with debt crisis 
being the most common. In addition, HIC suffered of currency and banking crisis, with no 
debt crises during the considered period 1980-2009. 
 
 
Figure 1: Income level comparison of crises occurrence 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 Financial crises or bank collapses refer to banking crises; analogously, currency crashes correspond to currency 
crises; finally, debt crises and sovereign debt default are used interchangeably. 
5
 The list of countries, the definition of variables and the sources of data, and some descriptive statistics are 
detailed in the Appendices 1 and 2. 
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3.2.2. Definition of exchange rate regimes (ERR) 
We measure ERR using the exchange rate regimes de facto classification of the IMF 
(see Appendix 3).6 Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of ERR using the income level-based 
classification of the World Bank. Pegged regimes, including exchange arrangements with no 
separate legal tender, currency boards, dollarization and currency unions, are the most popular 
monetary arrangements among LIC, LMIC and UMIC countries (roughly, 50% of them), 
while the remaining countries are divided between intermediate regimes (with crawling pegs, 
crawling bands and managed float, about 30%) and floaters (freely floating regimes with the 
exchange rate fully determined by the exchange market, about 20% of countries). In addition, 
the situation of HIC seems slightly different, with a more proportional distribution of the three 
core regimes mainly due to a higher proportion of floaters, while a consistent part of the 
pegged regimes are EMU countries, classified as fixed ERR.7 
 
Figure 2: The distribution of exchange rate regimes (ERR) 
 
 
Table 2 displays the likelihood of different types of crises among the three core ERR, defined 
using the IMF de facto classification (the upper part) and the Ilzetski, Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2010, IRR) classification (the bottom part). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 Since the use of de jure classification was found to engender misleading statistical inference in the assessment 
of the link between crises and ERR (Edwards and Sevestano, 1999, and Rogoff et al., 2004), we refrain from 
using it. In addition, we draw upon the natural de facto classification of Ilzetski, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) in 
our robustness analysis. 
7
 Since according to the European Commission (Directorate-General for Trade) the trade volume is stronger 
within the EMU compared to other non-EMU partners, it is plausible to consider EMU countries as being under 
a pegged rather than a floating regime. 
Etudes et Documents n° 26, CERDI, 2013 
 
 10
Table 2: Crises occurrence among ERR 
IMF classification 
Banking crises Currency crises Debt crises 
No Yes Freq. (%) No Yes Freq. (%) No Yes Freq. (%) 
Pegged 343 73 45.6 303 113 50.2 355 61 57.5 
Intermediate 243 53 33.1 221 75 33.3 266 30 28.3 
Floating 148 34 21.3 145 37 16.4 167 15 14.2 
Total 734 160 17.8 669 225 25.2 788 106 11.9 
IRR classification          
Pegged 246 46 33.6 233 59 33.5 257 35 42.7 
Intermediate 352 75 54.7 324 103 58.5 386 41 50 
Floating  42 16 11.7 44 14 8.0 52 6 7.3 
Total 640 137 21.4 601 176 29.3 695 82 11.8 
Note: The number of three-years periods is 894 (IMF) and 777 (IRR), divided for each crisis between crisis and non-crisis 
observations, with a total of 491 (IMF) and 395 (IRR) crisis observations. Bolded values represent, for each type of crisis, the 
ERR most frequently affected by crises. 
 
Based on the IMF classification, 160 (namely 17.8%) out of the 894 available observations 
are associated to banking crises, and out of the total of these crises episodes almost half 
(namely 73) concern countries with pegged ERR. Pegged arrangements are also the most 
affected by currency and debt crises (more than 50%), which occurred in 1 out of 4 and 9 
periods respectively, according to the IMF classification. Although the use of the IRR 
classification reduces the number of available observations, the distribution among the 
different types of crises is comparable for debt crises, with 4 percentage points more (less) for 
banking (currency) crises. However, one significant difference is that most of crises occur in 
intermediate ERR when using the IRR classification. 
3.2.3. Control variables 
Our analysis distinguishes among three types of crises, namely banking, debt and currency 
crises; consequently, when selecting control variables, we focused on the most appropriate 
variables for each type of crisis. 
 Regarding banking crisis, the first control variable is the domestic credit to the private 
sector.8 Following Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) and Arteta and Eichengreen 
(2000), credit expansion is a salient feature in the occurrence of crises, as highlighted by the 
recent financial crisis. A rapid development of banking credit reflects either a credit market 
with sufficiently safe borrowers or a situation of risk misassessment. This latter case can be 
very damaging for the stability of the financial system, since it favors the growing up of 
financial bubbles arising from rapid credit growth with lenders seeking permanently for more 
profits. Such a situation is unsustainable, and the collapse of the bubble weakens the financial 
                                                          
8
 We define it as financial resources provided to the private sector, such as loans, purchases of non-equity 
securities, trade credits, and other accounts that establish a claim for repayment. 
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system and can trigger panic/bank runs. Therefore, we expect a positive effect of the domestic 
credit on the probability of banking crises. The second control variable is the volatility of the 
domestic credit, measured by the standard deviation of domestic credits. High credit volatility 
can have damaging effects by leading to credit misallocation and by blurring private agents’ 
foresights. Consequently, we expect credit volatility to increase the odds of banking crisis. 
The third control variable is the sum between the claims on the domestic real nonfinancial 
sector by the Central Bank and the private credit by deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions, as a GDP ratio. It allows capturing differences in the size of the financial sector. 
On the one hand, a sizeable financial sector with complex financial products and multiple 
market players can be thought as detrimental because of greater exposure to financial 
imbalances. On the other hand, a large size of the financial sector can increase the risk-sharing 
opportunity. Therefore, the expected impact of the size of the financial sector on the 
probability of banking crises is ambiguous. Fourth, a variable of intermediation, built as the 
ratio between private credit supply and private deposits, proxies the ability of transforming 
deposits into credits, i.e. the intermediation capacity of the banking sector. The expected sign 
is positive. Finally, in addition to these four fundamental determinants of banking crises, we 
consider a variable that may affect banking crises’ probability, namely the regulation of the 
credit market. Intuitively, we expect a negative influence since authorities’ regulation of the 
credit market tends to lower the risk taken by bankers and therefore reduces the likelihood of 
crises. 
 Let us now turn our attention to currency crises fundamentals. First, the variable 
reserves money growth measures seigniorage revenues. Based on Buiter (2007), we define 
seigniorage as resources appropriated by monetary authorities through their capacity to issue 
zero interest fiat money, and measure it as the variation in the monetary base in percentage of 
GDP. This variable is particularly relevant in first-generation crises models, concluding that 
the main cause of currency crashes is the financing of fiscal deficits using seigniorage. 
Second, to reveal the fiscal stance of the government, and more widely the design of the fiscal 
policy, we consider the primary fiscal balance (FB), defined as the difference between fiscal 
revenues and expenditures. Large fiscal deficits may be an indirect source of financial 
imbalances, by generating inconsistency between fiscal and exchange rate policies (see first-
generation crises models) and therefore leading to currency and/or banking crises, as equally 
defended by the FTC hypothesis. Finally, in addition to these fundamentals, we consider 
subsequent variables that could affect the probability of currency crisis, namely the domestic 
credit to the private sector, broad money and the current account (Esaka, 2010a, b). 
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To evaluate the likelihood of debt crises, we consider first public debt, as a GDP ratio. 
Given that public debt is a prominent variable to predict sovereign debt defaults, its expected 
effect is positive. In addition, according to a recent literature emphasizing non-linear effects 
(see, for example, Ardagna et al., 2006), we equally account for the square of the debt to GDP 
ratio. Second, inflation may be a salient feature in predicting the occurrence of debt crises. 
While inflation may reduce the odds of domestic debt default, it also may increase the burden 
of the foreign currency-denominated debt when it leads to a nominal depreciation. Therefore 
the expected sign is ambiguous. Third, political institutions could also predict the likelihood 
of debt crises. We account for it by controlling whether there exist any constraints on the 
executive; if so, the odds of debt crises are expected to decrease, as the room for the 
incumbent government to overspend is somewhat reduced. Finally, some external conditions, 
as the aid flows, could influence the occurrence of debt crisis. Since these flows can be used 
to face the debt burden (in terms of interests and capital repayment) and therefore mitigate the 
probability of debt default, we expect a negative sign on the likelihood of debt default. 
The set of controls also includes variables that are common to all type of crises. On the 
one hand, output growth is assumed to negatively influence the occurrence of banking, 
currency or debt crisis. The output growth may help avoid banking disturbances by providing 
additional resources for the private sector and strengthening its capacity to meet credit 
reimbursement commitments. Regarding currency crises, the output growth leads to an 
increase in foreign exchange reserves and allows authorities supporting the fixity of the 
exchange rate or at least postponing the collapse of the peg. The same rationale prevails for 
debt crises, as in times of growth the increase of the resources of the government enhances its 
capacity to meet its commitments. On the other hand, as suggested by Glick and Hutchison, 
(2005) and Glick et al. (2006), the capital account openness captures the influence of the 
restrictions (or liberalization) of the capital account on the probability of banking, currency 
and debt crises. 
 
IV. Estimation results: the likelihood of crises 
Table 3.1 illustrates our baseline estimations of the likelihood of banking crises. To directly 
test the bipolar view, we focus on the variable Peg or float, which is a dummy coded one if a 
country is under pegged or floating regime and zero if the regime is qualified as intermediate 
(see Appendix 3 for details). 
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Table 3.1: Likelihood of banking crises 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Peg or float -0.049 -0.097 -0.130 -0.055 -0.075 -0.067 -0.132 -0.279 
 (0.835) (0.689) (0.587) (0.833) (0.773) (0.798) (0.622) (0.323) 
Domestic credit  0.013*** 0.009** 0.011** 0.013** 0.013** 0.013** 0.015** 
  (0.001) (0.018) (0.041) (0.021) (0.028) (0.029) (0.015) 
Volatility of DC   0.062*** 0.060*** 0.055*** 0.056*** 0.051*** 0.047** 
   (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.019) 
Size of the FS    -0.129 -0.364 -0.188 -0.231 -0.509 
    (0.835) (0.568) (0.779) (0.735) (0.491) 
Intermediation     0.001** 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 
     (0.035) (0.068) (0.091) (0.090) 
CM regulation      -0.163** -0.139* -0.168* 
      (0.035) (0.081) (0.057) 
Growth       -0.082** -0.083** 
       (0.034) (0.044) 
KA open        -0.057 
        (0.652) 
Obs. (countries) 893 (90) 893 892 (90) 840 (88) 839 (88) 759 (83) 759 (83) 691 (76) 
Pseudo-R² 0.035 0.039 0.037 0.051 0.046 0.040 0.045 0.038 
Wald-stat (Chi-2) 36.21 44.52 51.87 47.53 49.44 48.71 51.45 48.52 
Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood -381.4 -374.6 -367.2 -339.3 -336.9 -319.8 -317.4 -283.7 
% Obs. correctly called 78.0 76.2 77.8 78.2 78.5 76.4 76.1 78.2 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. Coefficients 
displayed are marginal effects. Hausman specification test suggested random effects with the Logit estimator. The predictive 
power is calculated using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). 
 
Starting from regression (1), we explore the sensitivity of the effect of ERR on the probability 
of banking crises by progressively adding relevant control variables. Notice that a 1 
percentage point increase in domestic credit (DC) or in its volatility increases the incidence of 
banking crises by roughly 1 and 5-6 percentage points respectively, a result consistent with 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997). Instead, as shown by columns (5)-(8), better credit 
market (CM) regulation, higher growth and a lower intermediation ratio reduce the 
probability of banking crises. Irrespective of the control variables used, the coefficient of the 
variable Peg or float is statistically not significant in regressions (1)-(8). These results clearly 
fail to support the bipolar view, since intermediate regimes are not more prone to banking 
crises than corner, namely pegged or floating, regimes.9 
Let us now discuss the results for currency crises, depicted in Table 3.2. As shown by 
columns (5)-(8), the seigniorage increases the odds of currency crises, confirming the fiscal 
theory of currency crises. We also notice that the capital account openness decreases the 
probability of currency crises (column 8), as it offers more flexibility in the implementation of 
                                                          
9
 Our findings are unchanged when performing regressions (1)-(8) by holding the number of observations 
constant (results are provided in the Supplementary Material section at the end of the manuscript). 
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the monetary policy for countries under fixed regimes (Esaka, 2010a, b). Finally, the fiscal 
balance (FB) does not matter in the prediction of currency crises: what matters is not whether 
governments generate fiscal deficits, but rather the way they finance such deficits. 
 
Table 3.2: Likelihood of currency crises 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Peg or float 0.073 0.166 0.360 0.349 0.339 0.333 0.277 0.418 
 (0.764) (0.510) (0.277) (0.296) (0.363) (0.378) (0.468) (0.297) 
Seigniorage  0.002 0.006 0.006 0.009* 0.009* 0.008* 0.010* 
  (0.348) (0.159) (0.150) (0.072) (0.073) (0.084) (0.052) 
FB   -0.021 -0.020 -0.014 -0.014 -0.007 -0.010 
   (0.501) (0.510) (0.684) (0.683) (0.831) (0.777) 
Domestic credit    0.004 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.018** 
    (0.530) (0.339) (0.340) (0.344) (0.022)  
Broad money     -0.038 -0.038 -0.038 -0.037 
     (0.251) (0.250) (0.247) (0.263) 
Growth       -0.005 -0.029 0.020 
      (0.924) (0.607) (0.742) 
Current account       -0.046 -0.013 
       (0.130) (0.689) 
KA open        -0.789*** 
        (0.000) 
Obs. (countries) 893 (90) 820 (83) 552 (73) 552 (73) 491 (66) 491 (66) 491 (66) 485 (65) 
Pseudo-R² 0.126 0.136 0.138 0.130 0.144 0.144 0.148 0.148 
Wald-stat (Chi-2) 58.79 56.92 36.61 36.44 26.59 26.58 28.14 38.78 
Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.032 0.030 0.001 
Log likelihood -417.2 -386.2 -261.0 -260.8 -213.7 -213.7 -212.5 -198.5 
% Obs. correctly called 67.7 68.9 69.0 68.3 67.4 68.3 69.2 71.8 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. Hausman 
specification test suggested random effects with the Logit estimator. Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. Once we 
introduce the variable Seigniorage in our models (from specification [3]), we drop Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Gabon, Senegal, Sudan, Suriname, Syria and Zimbabwe from the sample due to outliers. The predictive power is 
calculated using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). 
 
The non-significance of the variable Peg or float, whatever the control variables considered, 
breaks down the bipolar view, as there is no evidence that intermediate regimes are more 
prone to currency crises than pegs or floats. 
 Finally, the Table 3.3 focuses on debt crises. Unlike the two previous crises (banking 
and currency), empirical evidence on the determinants of debt crises is remarkably scarce. 
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Table 3.3: Likelihood of debt crises  
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Peg or float 0.597 0.545 0.546 0.567 0.337 0.399 0.354 0.222 
 (0.106) (0.142) (0.147) (0.144) (0.396) (0.343) (0.396) (0.644) 
Public debt  0.005 -0.004 0.001 -0.003 -0.006 -0.003 0.006 
  (0.105) (0.577) (0.889) (0.745) (0.593) (0.757) (0.634) 
Public debt squared   0.662** 0.496 0.637* 0.760** 0.753** 0.468 
   (0.023) (0.178) (0.077) (0.043) (0.034) (0.216) 
Inflation    0.067 0.060 0.058 0.046 0.041 
    (0.396) (0.430) (0.439) (0.530) (0.617) 
Growth     -0.183*** -0.200*** -0.214*** -0.211*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Executive constraint      -0.111 0.047 -0.014 
      (0.285) (0.650) (0.907) 
Aid       -0.111** -0.146** 
       (0.024) (0.022) 
KA open        -0.377 
        (0.107) 
Obs. (countries) 893 (90) 875 (90) 875 (90) 855 (90) 855 (90) 798 (86) 597 (66) 517 (58) 
Pseudo-R² 0.230 0.229 0.234 0.242 0.239 0.244 0.181 0.214 
Wald-stat (Chi-2) 40.45 42.34 44.90 44.56 50.21 50.11 49.50 42.83 
Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood -236.8 -234.4 -230.6 -223.2 -216.7 -200.7 -183.7 -153.9 
% Obs. correctly called 88.1 87.7 87.7 87.8 87.6 87.0 82.7 82.7 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. Hausman 
specification test suggested random effects with the Logit estimator. Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. The 
predictive power is calculated using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). 
 
Among the most important fundamentals, macroeconomic imbalances in terms of 
unsustainable public debt affect the occurrence of debt crises. The positive sign of the squared 
term suggests that a large share of public debt to GDP increases the odds of debt default, with 
some non-linearity. On the contrary, output growth reduces significantly the incidence of 
default10 Finally, results in column (7) support the use of aid flows as a hedge against 
sovereign debt default, since higher aid significantly decreases the odds of debt crises. 
Coming back to our main analysis, we follow the strategy emphasized earlier and contrast 
intermediate regimes with corner regimes. As emphasized by columns (1)-(8), there is no 
support that intermediate regimes matter for debt crisis compared to fixed or peg exchange 
rate regimes.11 In short, we clearly break down the bipolar view, as the occurrence of banking, 
currency or debt crises was not found to be related to the presence of a particular exchange 
rate regime. 
                                                          
10
 Manasse and Roubini (2009) provide an interesting discussion regarding the economic growth mechanism as a 
necessary but not sufficient condition to avoid debt default. 
11
 The inclusion of the variable aid in regressions (7)-(8) decreases the sample size, mainly since high income 
countries do not receive aid flows and are therefore excluded. Despite that, our main results remain unchanged. 
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V. Sensitivity Analysis 
The goal of this section is to explore the robustness of our results. For each type of crises, we 
consider the widest specification, namely column (8) from Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 above. In 
addition, to better focus our analysis and keep the paper short, we present all along this 
sensitivity section only interest coefficients (full results are at the end of the manuscript as 
supplementary material). 
5.1. Accounting for contagion effects 
A strand of influential papers, including Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) or Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2011), emphasized the importance of contagion effects between different types of 
crises in a given country. We present in Table 4 results for the influence of the ERR on the 
likelihood of crises, when controlling for such contagion effects. 
 
Table 4: Likelihood of crises and contagion effects 
Banking crises Currency crises Debt crises 
Peg or float -0.260 -0.331 Peg or float 0.439 0.395 Peg or float 0.255 0.282 
 (0.337) (0.232)  (0.270) (0.328)  (0.593) (0.564) 
Currency crises 0.701**  Banking crises 0.523  Banking crises 1.231***  
 (0.016)   (0.175)   (0.004)  
Debt crises  1.015*** Debt crises  2.449*** Currency crises  2.017*** 
  (0.004)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Obs. (countries) 691 (76) 691 (76) Obs. (countries) 485 (65) 485 (65) Obs. (countries) 517 (58) 517 (58) 
Pseudo-R² 0.018 0.025 Pseudo-R² 0.124 0.106 Pseudo-R² 0.196 0.157 
Wald-stat (Chi-2) 55.28 56.10 Wald-stat (Chi-2) 40.05 49.26 Wald-stat (Chi-2) 47.02 50.09 
Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.000 Wald (p-value) 0.002 0.000 Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood -281.0 -279.9 Log likelihood -197.6 -187.8 Log likelihood -149.7 -144.3 
% Obs. corr. called 77.8 77.7 % Obs. corr. called 70.8 76.1 % Obs. corr. called 83.9 85.1 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. Hausman specification test suggested random 
effects with the Logit estimator. All specifications include time dummies. Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. The 
predictive power is calculated using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). The full table is reported as supplementary 
material at the end of the manuscript. 
 
The burst of other types of crises increases the probability of having a banking, currency or 
debt crisis (except for the effect that transits from banking to currency crises, which is found 
not significant). However, even when accounting for the presence of such important 
contagion effects, we find yet again no support for an influence of ERR on the probability of 
experiencing a banking, currency or debt crisis. 
5.2. Is the proneness of the regimes influenced by the level of development or the time period? 
An important criticism of our analysis may be related to the possible heterogeneities in the 
effect of the ERR on the likelihood of crises, depending on the level of economic 
development. For example, one should account for the absence of debt crises for high income 
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countries during the period we consider. One alternative to tackle this shortcoming is to 
include the GDP per capita, capturing the level of economic development, as an additional 
explanatory variable.12 However, a better solution is to perform individual regressions for 
each group of countries, according to their level of development (Table 5.1). For generality, 
we draw upon the World Bank’s country income level classification and distinguish among 
high income, including OECD, countries (HIC), upper middle income countries (UMIC) and 
low and lower middle income countries (LIC and LMIC respectively). 
 
Table 5.1: Likelihood of crises: Income level comparisons 
 Banking crises  Currency crises  Debt crises  
 LIC & LMIC UMIC HIC LIC & LMIC UMIC HIC LIC & LMIC UMIC 
Peg or float -0.144 -1.797* 0.684 0.694 0.930 0.498 0.525 -0.818 
 (0.688) (0.063) (0.380) (0.178) (0.472) (0.728) (0.367) (0.482) 
         
Obs. (countries) 328 (38) 132 (14) 231 (24) 236 (33) 111 (13) 138 (19) 361 (41) 135 (14) 
Pseudo-R² 0.006 0.056 0.011 0.076 0.134 0.000 0.230 0.121 
Wald-stat (Chi-2) 28.86 9.666 26.29 22.70 14.33 20.38 24.13 12.49 
Wald (p-value) 0.035 0.917 0.069 0.159 0.644 0.255 0.116 0.769 
Log likelihood -134.8 -46.56 -69.14 -96.20 -36.23 -29.30 -100.4 -32.50 
% Obs. corr. called 54.7 67.7 70.4 61.9 60.6 53.1 82.2 80.2 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. Hausman 
specification test suggested random effects with the Logit estimator. Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. No debt 
crises for HIC during the period of our analysis. The predictive power is calculated using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka 
(2010b). The full table is reported as supplementary material at the end of the manuscript. 
 
Irrespective of the considered crisis, extreme ERR do not exert a statistically different effect 
on the probability of experiencing a crisis, compared to intermediate ERR. Thus, our analysis 
performed on groups of countries located at different stages of economic development 
concludes, yet again, against the bipolar view, in line with our main findings. 
 In addition to this analysis, our results might be biased by time heterogeneity. 
Therefore, we check the stability of our findings by performing estimations on two sub-
periods, namely before and after 1990. This splitting was chosen to reflect the worldwide 
major institutional changes related to the end of the Cold War. Whatever the crisis considered, 
the variable of interest is never significant (Table 5.2). Therefore, our results show that the 
rejection of the bipolar view is not specific to a period. 
  
                                                          
12
 We report that the coefficients of the variable Peg or float (together with their p-values) for the regressions (8) 
from Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 augmented with the variable GDP per capita are respectively 0.130 (0.629), 0.061 
(0.874) and 0.249 (0.537). 
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Table 5.2: Likelihood of crises: Period comparisons 
  Banking crises Currency crises Debt crises 
  Before 1990 After 1990 Before 1990 After 1990 Before 1990 After 1990 
Peg or float -0.325 -0.410 0.443 -0.561 -1.088 0.693 
 (0.448) (0.320) (0.403) (0.495) (0.220) (0.303) 
       
Obs. (countries) 254 (69) 437 (76) 294 (65) 191 (60) 320 (58) 197 (53) 
Pseudo-R² 0.014 0.050 0.090 0.157 0.309 0.111 
Wald-stat (Chi-2) 14.06 37.94 14.09 17.81 15.43 12.43 
Wald (p-value) 0.230 0.000 0.367 0.0861 0.281 0.332 
Log likelihood -117.5 -156.7 -116.3 -81.67 -62.18 -84.55 
% Obs. corr. called 78.0 79.1 64.3 72.0 70.4 83.1 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. Hausman 
specification test suggested random effects with the Logit estimator. Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. The 
predictive power is calculated using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). The full table is reported as supplementary 
material at the end of the manuscript. 
5.3. Are the results robust to the estimation method? 
In the following, we allow for alternative methods of estimation of the effect of the ERR on 
the likelihood of crises. 
 
Table 6.1: Likelihood of crises: Alternative binary estimation methods 
  Banking crises Currency crises Debt crises 
  Logit FE Probit Logit FE Probit Logit FE Probit 
Peg or float -0.115 -0.166 0.710 0.232 0.598 0.117 
 (0.733) (0.295) (0.128) (0.311) (0.308) (0.658) 
       
Obs. (countries) 516 (54) 691 (76) 339 (44) 485 (65) 262 (27) 517 (58) 
Pseudo-R² 0.198 0.038 0.362 0.150 0.344 0.218 
Wald (Chi-2) 76.10 52.76 92.61 43.16 68.66 46.55 
Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood -154.5 -283.2 -81.54 -198.3 -65.49 -153.5 
% Obs. correctly called 35.8 76.9 36.5 70.1 43.3 81.6 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. 
Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. The Probit models are estimated with random effects. The predictive power is 
calculated using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). The full table is reported as supplementary material at the end of 
the manuscript. 
 
Table 6.2: Likelihood of crises: OLS estimations 
 Banking crises Currency crises Debt crises  
 Pooled FE RE Pooled FE RE Pooled FE RE 
Peg or float -0.047 -0.008 -0.036 0.008 0.035 0.021 0.009 0.018 0.014 
 (0.137) (0.837) (0.276) (0.849) (0.463) (0.629) (0.782) (0.627) (0.668) 
 
         
Obs. (countries) 691 691 (76) 691 (76) 485 485 (65) 485 (65) 517 517 (58) 517 (58) 
R-squared 0.101 0.113 0.0998 0.144 0.187 0.132 0.128 0.148 0.118 
Fischer-stat 4.447 4.469  4.615 5.457  4.294 4.500  
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  
Wald-stat   75.66   89.93   78.31 
(p-value)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. 
Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. The full table is reported as supplementary material at the end of the manuscript. 
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According to Table 6.1, the use of fixed, instead of random, effects logit or of probit 
estimators has no qualitative effects on the coefficients of our interest variable Peg or float, 
which remain statistically not significant. In addition, the significance of these coefficients is 
not improved when considering OLS, instead of binary, estimators in Table 6.2. 
Consequently, our previous findings of non-systematic vulnerability of intermediate ERR to 
banking, currency and sovereign debt crises are robust to alternative estimation methods, 
contradicting yet again the bipolar view. 
5.4. Alternative definitions of the ERR variable 
In our main regressions, we differentiated among corner ERR, namely peg or float ERR, and 
intermediate regimes. In the following, we refine this classification by specifically 
differentiating among peg and float ERR, while still keeping the intermediated regimes as 
reference (see Appendix 3). 
 
Table 7: Pair comparison of the likelihood of crises 
 Banking crises Currency crises Debt crises 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
Peg -0.143  -0.068 -0.298  -0.340 -0.150  0.174 
 (0.686)  (0.847) (0.584)  (0.497) (0.791)  (0.763) 
Float  -0.399 -0.487  0.721 0.991**  0.183 0.118 
 
 (0.274) (0.167)  (0.173) (0.045)  (0.815) (0.849) 
Obs. (countries) 491 (70) 505 (63) 691 (76) 347 (59) 357 (55) 485 (65) 402 (57) 334 (46) 517 (58) 
Pseudo R 0.020 0.041 0.039 0.122 0.154 0.137 0.196 0.180 0.213 
Wald (stat) 28.69 37.75 48.43 33.39 29.93 40.64 29.63 23.38 42.95 
Wald (p-value) 0.037 0.002 0.000 0.010 0.026 0.001 0.029 0.137 0.000 
Log likelihood -219.5 -215.0 -283.2 -143.6 -146.0 -195.9 -131.9 -96.01 -153.9 
Test 1 [Peg]=[Float]   0.99   5.21   0.01 
Chi-2 (p-value)   0.319   0.022   0.936 
Test 2 [Peg]=[Float]=0   1.96   5.90   0.10 
Chi-2 (p-value)   0.376   0.052   0.950 
% Obs. corr. called 73.3 73.6 78.0 71.2 65.5 72.0 81.8 83.8 82.3 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. Hausman 
specification test suggested random effects with the Logit estimator. Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. The 
predictive power is calculated using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). The full table is reported as supplementary 
material at the end of the manuscript. 
 
According to column (1) in Table 7, peg regimes are not found to significantly increase the 
probability of experiencing a banking crisis, compared to intermediate regimes. The same 
holds when comparing floating regimes with intermediate regimes, as emphasized by column 
(2). These findings are supported by the results illustrated in column (3), where we 
simultaneously account for the effect of peg and floating ERR on the likelihood of banking 
crises. Moreover, the high p-values of the equality tests between the coefficients of peg and 
float variables confirm that the effect of alternative corner ERR, namely peg or floating, on 
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the likelihood of banking crises is statistically identical, supporting our strategy of 
considering them jointly in our main analysis. While the results are more mitigated for 
currency crises (columns 4-6), the evidence for debt crises (columns 7-9) confirms once again 
the absence of significant differences between the effects of corner and intermediate ERR on 
the likelihood of crises. 
In the following, we go one step further, by additionally decomposing our corner ERR 
variable. As emphasized by Table 8 based on IMF’s classification, the variable Peg or float is 
the one used in our main analysis. Starting from this benchmark, we restrict the definition of 
corner ERR regimes by progressively dropping conventional peg and managed float ERR 
(Peg or Float1), currency union and EMU regimes (Peg or Float2) and currency boards (Peg 
or Float3). Notice that following this logic, the variable Peg or Float3 corresponds to the most 
narrow definition of corner ERR regimes, since it includes only extreme forms of pegs 
(another currency as legal tender, for example dollarization) and extreme forms of floating 
(floating regimes, namely freely floating). The rationale is that the more extreme the ERR, the 
bigger the room for finding a significant effect on the likelihood of crises for these extreme 
ERR compared to intermediate ERR. 
 
Table 8: Alternative definitions of corner EER based on IMF’s classification 
Fine Coarse Peg or float Peg or float1 Peg or float2 Peg or float3 
another currency 
Peg 
1 1 1 1 
currency board 1 1 1 excluded 
currency union/emu 1 1 excluded excluded 
conventional peg 1 excluded excluded excluded 
conventional basket 
Intermediate 
0 0 0 0 
band peg 0 0 0 0 
forward cp 0 0 0 0 
forward cb 0 0 0 0 
backward cp 0 0 0 0 
backward cb 0 0 0 0 
other managed 0 0 0 0 
managed float Floating 1 excluded excluded excluded 
floating 1 1 1 1 
Note: Fine classifications are fully detailed in Appendix 3. 
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Table 9.1: Alternative definitions of the ERR variable: banking crises 
 [1] [2] [3] LIC & LMIC UMIC HIC 
Peg or float1 -0.308   -0.517 -1.949 1.422* 
 (0.395)   (0.268) (0.100) (0.097) 
Peg or float2  -0.162     
  (0.705)     
Peg or float3   -0.175    
   (0.693)    
Obs. (countries) 528 (74) 439 (65) 435 (65) 221 (36) 102 (14) 205 (24) 
Pseudo-R² 0.024 0.029 0.029 0.000 0.047 0.014 
Wald (stat) 32.43 28.24 29.22 22.80 8.921 24.53 
Wald (p-value) 0.0133 0.0422 0.0326 0.156 0.943 0.106 
Log likelihood -228.1 -200.2 -195.7 -88.09 -36.99 -64.64 
% Obs. correctly called 72.3 70.6 70.8 50.9 68.5 69.3 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. Hausman 
specification test suggested random effects with the Logit estimator. Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. The 
predictive power is calculated using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). The full table is reported as supplementary 
material at the end of the manuscript. 
Table 9.2: Alternative definitions of the ERR variable: currency crises 
 [1] [2] [3] LIC & LMIC UMIC HIC 
Peg or float1 -0.066   0.504 -2.451 1.134 
 (0.918)   (0.571) (0.701) (0.442) 
Peg or float2  0.165     
  (0.823)     
Peg or float3   0.265    
   (0.736)    
Obs. (countries) 360 (62) 324 (57) 320 (57) 157 (31) 75 (11) 120 (18) 
Pseudo-R² 0.153 0.164 0.172 0.050 0.155 0.000 
Wald (stat) 27.84  27.05 12.00 14.85 17.97 
Wald (p-value) 0.0468  0.0574 0.800 0.606 0.391 
Log likelihood -142.8 -128.4 -124.3 -60.96 -18.79 -28.33 
% Obs. correctly called 72.8 71.6 73.1 58.1 55.9 62.8 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. Hausman 
specification test suggested random effects with the Logit estimator. Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. The 
predictive power is calculated using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). The full table is reported as supplementary 
material at the end of the manuscript. 
Table 9.3: Alternative definitions of the ERR variable: debt crises 
  [1] [2] [3] LIC & LMIC UMIC 
Peg or float1 -0.457   -0.036 -1.074 
 (0.527)   (0.972) (0.379) 
Peg or float2  -0.678    
  (0.452)    
Peg or float3   -0.774   
   (0.413)   
Obs. (countries) 373 (56) 303 (48) 299 (48) 245 (39) 108 (14) 
Pseudo-R² 0.123 0.161 0.140 0.124 0.011 
Wald (stat) 29.59 26.61 26.07 13.68 9.086 
Wald (p-value) 0.0295 0.0640 0.0731 0.690 0.938 
Log likelihood -114.5 -96.39 -93.56 -66.05 -27.82 
% Obs. correctly called 84.7 82.8 83.6 83.6 78.5 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. Hausman 
specification test suggested random effects with the Logit estimator. Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. No debt 
crises for HIC during the period of our analysis. The predictive power is calculated using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka 
(2010b). The full table is reported as supplementary material at the end of the manuscript. 
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According to the first column of Table 9.1, the use of an alternative definition for corner ERR 
does not change our previous findings: more restrictive ERR, namely with conventional peg 
and managed float excluded, are not found to be more prone to banking crises compared to 
intermediate regimes. Moreover, as emphasized by columns (2)-(3), the use of a more narrow 
definition for our interest variable, by additionally excluding currency unions and then 
currency boards, still refutes the bipolar view. In addition, we disentangle the variable Peg of 
float1 according to the level of income, using the same classification from section 5.2 above. 
As reported by the last three regressions, accounting for the level of economic development 
does not allow capturing a significantly different effect of ERR on the likelihood of banking 
crises, compared to intermediate ERR. Finally, for robustness issues, we perform the same 
analysis for currency crises (Table 9.2) and debt crises (Table 9.3); yet again, we fail to 
observe significant differences between corner and intermediate ERR.13 To summarize, this 
analysis confirms the robustness of our main results when considering alternative ERR 
classifications.14 
5.5. Alternative databases for the main variables: crises and exchange rate regimes 
One criticism for our main results may arise from combining data from Reinhart & Rogoff 
(2011) with data from Leaven and Valencia (2012) to define crises episodes. To tackle this 
point, we present in the following results based on the use of crises episodes from Reinhart 
and Rogoff’s database alone. Due to gaps in their database, the number of countries in our 
sample falls from 90 to 59 countries.15 
  
                                                          
13
 Besides, accounting for the level of income for each of the two remaining corner ERR variables, namely Peg 
or float2 and Peg or float3, and for each of the three types of crises, still supports our main findings (these 
estimations are fully reported as supplementary material). 
14
 All our findings are established by holding the group of intermediate ERR identical (see Table 8). For 
robustness issues, we performed estimations in which the group of intermediate ERR is extended with the ERR 
excluded from the definition of Peg or float variables. These results, available upon request, equally refute the 
bipolar view. 
15
 The countries dropped are: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo Republic, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kuwait, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Nepal, Niger, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian 
Arab Republic, Togo and Uganda. 
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Table 10.1: Alternative databases for crises and ERR: banking crises 
IMF classification  IRR classification 
 [1] [2] [3] [4]  [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Peg or float 0.125    Peg_or_float 0.030    
 (0.620)     (0.899)    
Peg or float1  0.326   Peg_or_float_1  -0.018   
  (0.381)     (0.944)   
Peg or float2   0.298  Peg_or_float_2   -0.072  
   (0.447)     (0.796)  
Peg or float3    0.344 Peg_or_float_3    0.262 
 
   (0.407)     (0.439) 
Obs. (countries) 496 (53) 377 (53) 351 (52) 347 (52) Obs. (countries) 491 (53) 453 (53) 453 (53) 453 (53) 
Pseudo-R² 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 Pseudo-R² 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.003 
Wald (stat) 44.82 33.11 29.77 31.16 Wald (stat) 42.72 38.91 38.98 39.07 
Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.010 0.028 0.019 Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Log likelihood -267.8 -202.3 -191.9 -187.3 Log likelihood -262.9 -237.8 -237.8 -237.5 
% Obs. corr. called 59.4 57.2 57.2 58.2 % Obs. corr. called 59.4 61.5 61.1 61.5 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. Hausman 
specification test suggested random effects with the Logit estimator. Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. The IMF 
and IRR classifications of ERR lead to different definitions of corner ERR variables. The predictive power is calculated using 
a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). The full table is reported as supplementary material at the end of the manuscript. 
The first four columns of Table 10.1 report estimations based on the IMF’s classification of 
ERR. For robustness issues, we disentangle the interest variable in several alternative 
variables measuring corner ERR, following the definitions used previously. As emphasized 
by columns (1)-(4) of Table 10.1, the coefficient of our interest variable is statistically not 
significant, supporting our previous findings that corner exchange rate regimes are not more 
prone to banking crises compared to intermediate regimes. 
In the following, we investigate the robustness of our results to the use of an 
alternative classification for our main variable, namely ERR. To do so, we draw upon the 
Ilzetski, Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2010) natural de facto classification of ERR, and define the 
following dummies. Peg_or_float is the widest measure of corner ERR, since it includes all 
forms of peg (namely hard pegs and de facto pegs) and all forms of floating (namely managed 
and freely floating), as reported by Table 11 and Appendix 4. By so doing, the variable 
Peg_or_float aims at matching, to the extent to which this is possible given the use of two 
different databases, the variable Peg or float based on the IMF database. 
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Table 11: Alternative definitions of corner EER based on IRR’s classification 
Fine Coarse Peg_or_float Peg_or_float_1 Peg_or_float_2 Peg_or_float_3 
no separate Hard peg 1 1 1 1 
currency board 1 1 1 1 
defacto peg Peg 1 1 excluded excluded 
crawling peg 
Intermediate 
0 0 0 0 
crawling band 0 0 0 0 
defacto cp 0 0 0 0 
defacto cb 0 0 0 0 
wider cb 0 0 0 0 
defacto cb narrower 0 0 0 0 
moving band 0 0 0 0 
managed float Floating 1 1 1 excluded 
freely floating 1 1 1 1 
freely falling  0 excluded excluded excluded 
Note: Fine classifications are fully detailed in Appendix 4. 
Using the variable Peg_or_float as benchmark, we refine it as follows. Peg_or_float_1 
includes the same corner regimes, but we exclude freely falling observations from 
intermediate regimes. According to IRR, freely falling observations refer to countries that 
present inflation rates above 40%, irrespective of their ERR. Next, we restrict the definition of 
corner ERR by progressively dropping de facto pegs (Peg_or_float_2) and managed float 
regimes (Peg_or_float_3). As previously, the rationale is that restricting at most the definition 
of corner ERR might unveil a significant effect compared to intermediate ERR. 
The results based on the use of the IRR database for the ERR are illustrated in 
columns (5)-(8) in Table 10.1. Despite alternative measures of extreme ERR, we fail to reveal 
a significantly different effect of such regimes on the likelihood of banking crises, compared 
to intermediate regimes. In addition, excluding observations for countries with inflation rates 
above 40% does not alter our findings, thus confirming previous evidence based on the IMF’s 
classification of ERR. 
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Table 10.2: Alternative databases for crises and ERR: currency crises 
IMF classification  IRR classification 
 [1] [2] [3] [4]  [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Peg or float 0.477    Peg_or_float -0.151    
 (0.200)     (0.686)    
Peg or float1  0.413   Peg_or_float_1  0.104   
  (0.493)     (0.774)   
Peg or float2   0.428  Peg_or_float_2   0.178  
   (0.476)     (0.649)  
Peg or float3    0.542 Peg_or_float_3    -0.087 
 
   (0.398)     (0.870) 
Obs. (countries) 353 (48) 266 (46) 263 (46) 259 (46) Obs. (countries) 350 (48) 310 (48) 310 (48) 310 (48) 
Pseudo-R² 0.037 0.056 0.055 0.061 Pseudo-R² 0.048 0.019 0.016 0.021 
Wald (stat) 49.50 37.38 36.60 35.73 Wald (stat) 49.01 38.68 39.02 38.30 
Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.004 Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 
Log likelihood -178.1 -130.0 -129.9 -126.0 Log likelihood -175.3 -158.4 -158.4 -158.5 
% Obs corr. called 65.7 65.7 65.0 66.0 % Obs corr. called 66.8 64.8 64.8 65.8 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. Hausman 
specification test suggested random effects with the Logit estimator. Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. The IMF 
and IRR classifications of ERR lead to different definitions of corner ERR variables. The predictive power is calculated using 
a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). The full table is reported as supplementary material at the end of the manuscript. 
 
Table 10.3: Alternative databases for crises and ERR: debt crises 
IMF classification  IRR classification 
 [1] [2] [3] [4]  [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Peg or float 0.115    Peg_or_float -0.345    
 (0.807)     (0.485)    
Peg or float1  -1.371   Peg_or_float_1  -0.430   
  (0.123)     (0.465)   
Peg or float2   -1.371  Peg_or_float_2   -0.755  
   (0.123)     (0.240)  
Peg or float3    -1.441 Peg_or_float_3    -0.889 
 
   (0.121)     (0.237) 
Obs. (countries) 313 (34) 211 (34) 211 (34) 207 (34) Obs. (countries) 310 (34) 262 (34) 262 (34) 262 (34) 
Pseudo-R² 0.100 0.099 0.099 0.089 Pseudo-R² 0.109 0.089 0.094 0.095 
Wald (stat) 51.56 32.26 32.26 31.22 Wald (stat) 50.97 38.76 38.67 39.09  
Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.014 0.014 0.018  Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Log likelihood -133.8 -91.04 -91.04 -90.13  Log likelihood -131.6 -105.2 -104.7 -104.7  
% Obs. corr. called 72.5 73.9 73.9 72.4 % Obs. corr. called 71.9 74.8 73.6 73.2 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. Hausman 
specification test suggested random effects with the Logit estimator. Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. The IMF 
and IRR classifications of ERR lead to different definitions of corner ERR variables. The predictive power is calculated using 
a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). The full table is reported as supplementary material at the end of the manuscript. 
 
Finally, Tables 10.2 and 10.3 perform the same analysis for currency and debt crises 
respectively.16 Irrespective of the database used to classify ERR, namely IMF or Ilzetski, 
Reinhart and Rogoff, or of the way corner ERR are defined, we still fail to find a significantly 
                                                          
16
 As previously, we performed for robustness issues estimations in which the group of intermediate ERR is 
extended with the ERR excluded from the definition of Peg_or_float variables, without however identifying 
qualitative changes in the effect of corner ERR on the likelihood of crises (results are available upon request). 
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different effect of extreme ERR on the occurrence of currency and debt crises, compared to 
intermediate ERR. Consequently, our former findings of no bipolar view persist, and are 
equally robust to the sample selection bias analyzed in this subsection. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper offers an overview on the link between crises and exchange rate regimes. Based on 
a panel of developing and developed countries over the period 1980-2009, we show that the 
type of exchange rate regime is unimportant when it comes to explaining the likelihood of 
crises. This result holds to a wide set of robustness specifications. First, our findings do not 
characterize a specific type of crisis, but they are common to banking, currency and debt 
crises, and also when controlling for appropriate determinants of each type of crisis. Second, 
accounting for contagion effects between the three types of crises or controlling for the level 
of economic development leaves our results unchanged. Third, our results are robust to the 
use of alternative definitions of corner ERR. Finally, conducting the analysis on alternative 
databases for our main variables, namely ERR and crises, has no impact on our findings. 
Consequently, our results vigorously contradict the view that intermediate exchange rate 
regimes are more prone to crises than hard pegs and independently floating regimes. In other 
words, although the likelihood of crises might depend of fiscal, financial and monetary 
variables, it is not related to the exchange rate regime in place. Thus, we clearly break down 
the bipolar view. 
The policy implications of this paper appear straightforward. Our main findings show 
that crises and ERR are not systematically interrelated. Therefore, countries aiming at 
preventing economic crises should not focus on the choice of an appropriate exchange rate 
regime alone, and instead proceed to structural reforms by implementing sound 
macroeconomic and financial policies to safeguard against crises-conducting behaviors, such 
as reckless credit expansion, unsustainable fiscal policy or exploding debt paths policies. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: The list of countries by income level 
Low and Lower Middle Income Countries (LIC and LMIC): Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Rep., Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
Upper Middle Income Countries: Argentina, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Gabon, Jamaica, Jordan, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Panama, Peru, South Africa, Suriname, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
High Income Countries: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea Rep., Kuwait, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 
 
Appendix 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source 
Domestic credit 900 43.737 39.167 0 243.996 
World Bank, World 
Development Indicators (WDI) 
2011 
Volatility of DC  898 3.622 6.078 0 77.488 
Inflation 880 0.857 1.733 -8.156 49.29 
Seigniorage 897 38.278 336.733 -54.687 8038.996 
GDP per capita 900 8984.905 12611.32 36.699 65669.99 
Official development 
assistance (Aid) 670 6.109 7.415 -0.200 50.186 
Output growth 900 3.298 3.367 -17.320 19.618 
Broad money 838 43.90289 395.956 0.0001 5784.176 
Current account balance 897 -2.795 7.713 -60.506 43.472 
Public debt 881 66.948 53.743 2.748 967.851 Ali Abbas et al., (2010) Historical Public Debt database 
Primary fiscal balance 595 -3.153 5.589 -25.636 37.208 IMF, IFS 2011 
Credit market regulation 820 6.715 2.116 0 10 Economic Freedom Network dataset, 2011 
Size of the financial sector 845 0.506 0.316 0.033 2.374 Beck and Demirgüc-Kunt, 
Financial Structure dataset, 2010 Bank credits/bank deposit (Intermediation) 877 7.538 70.158 0.100 942.291 
Executive constraint 837 4.752 2.241 1 7 Polity IV project database, 2010 
Capital account openness 804 0.088 1.498 -1.843 2.477 Chinn and Ito database, 2008 
 
Appendix 3: IMF classification of exchange rate regimes (ERR) 
Codes IMF fine classification Coarse classification 
1 Another currency as legal tender 
Peg 
2 Currency board 
3 Currency union 
4 Economic union/Monetary coordination agreement 
5 Conventional fixed peg to a single currency 
6 Conventional fixed peg to a basket 
Intermediate 
7 Pegged within horizontal bands 
8 Forward-looking crawling peg 
9 Forward-looking crawling band 
10 Backward-looking crawling peg 
11 Backward-looking crawling band 
12 Other tightly managed floating 
13 Managed floating with no predetermined path for the exchange rate Floating 14 Independently floating 
Note: No observation in category 4 in our sample. 
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Appendix 4: Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) classification of ERR 
Codes Fine classifications Coarse classification 
1 No separate legal tender 
Pegged 2 Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement 3 Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% 
4 De facto peg 
5 Pre announced crawling peg 
Intermediate 
6 Pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% 
7 De factor crawling peg 
8 De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% 
9 Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2% 
10 De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-5% 
11 Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% (i.e. it allows for 
both appreciation and depreciation over time)  
12 Managed floating Floating  13 Freely floating 
14 Freely falling Other 15 Dual market in which parallel market data is missing 
Note: No observation in category 3 in our sample. Due to controversies around their definition, we exclude from 
our sample observations from category 15. 
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Supplementary Material: to be published as supplementary on-line 
material or/and in the working paper version of the manuscript 
 
Table 3.1.1: Likelihood of banking crises, with a constant number of observations 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Peg or float -0.055 -0.100 -0.139 -0.142 -0.172 -0.218 -0.290 -0.279 
 (0.837) (0.720) (0.617) (0.611) (0.534) (0.432) (0.304) (0.323) 
Domestic credit  0.013*** 0.008* 0.009 0.011* 0.014** 0.015** 0.015** 
  (0.004) (0.060) (0.147) (0.063) (0.019) (0.017) (0.015) 
Volatility of DC   0.059*** 0.058*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.047** 0.047** 
   (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.018) (0.019) 
Size of the FS    -0.089 -0.450 -0.419 -0.505 -0.509 
    (0.903) (0.546) (0.565) (0.497) (0.491) 
Intermediation     0.001** 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 
     (0.037) (0.063) (0.080) (0.090) 
CM regulation      -0.211*** -0.181** -0.168* 
      (0.010) (0.030) (0.057) 
Growth       -0.084** -0.083** 
       (0.041) (0.044) 
KA open        -0.057 
        (0.652) 
Obs. (countries) 691 (76) 691 (76) 691 (76) 691 (76) 691 (76) 691 (76) 691 (76) 691 (76) 
Pseudo-R² 0.037 0.044 0.042 0.042 0.038 0.036 0.039 0.038 
Wald-stat (Chi-2) 27.68 33.49 39.18 39.14 41.04 45.51 48.29 48.52 
Wald (p-value) 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood -301.2 -296.3 -291.6 -291.6 -289.3 -285.9 -283.8 -283.7 
% Obs. correctly called 78.0 76.7 78.1 77.9 78.4 77.3 76.9 78.4 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. Coefficients 
displayed are marginal effects. Hausman specification test suggested random effects with the Logit estimator. The predictive 
power is calculated using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). 
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Table 3.2.1: Likelihood of currency crises, with a constant number of observations 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Peg or float 0.202 0.262 0.260 0.246 0.310 0.310 0.258 0.418 
 (0.581) (0.483) (0.486) (0.517) (0.417) (0.422) (0.508) (0.297) 
Seigniorage  0.009* 0.009* 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.009* 0.010* 
  (0.053) (0.051) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.057) (0.052) 
FB   -0.011 -0.012 -0.015 -0.015 -0.010 -0.010 
   (0.735) (0.726) (0.664) (0.664) (0.787) (0.777) 
Domestic credit    0.005 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.018** 
    (0.425) (0.238) (0.238) (0.249) (0.022) 
Broad money     -0.043 -0.043 -0.044 -0.037 
     (0.204) (0.206) (0.202) (0.263) 
Growth       0.000 -0.022 0.020 
      (0.993) (0.708) (0.742) 
Current account       -0.042 -0.013 
       (0.184) (0.689) 
KA open        -0.789*** 
        (0.000) 
Obs. (countries) 485 (65) 485 (65) 485 (65) 485 (65) 485 (65) 485 (65) 485 (65) 485 (65) 
Pseudo-R² 0.157 0.160 0.157 0.149 0.151 0.150 0.154 0.148 
Wald-stat (Chi-2) 24.66 26.77 26.88 26.69 27.72 27.72 28.99 38.78 
Wald (p-value) 0.006 0.004 0.008 0.013 0.015 0.023 0.0240 0.001 
Log likelihood -212.3 -210.5 -210.4 -210.1 -209.2 -209.2 -208.3 -198.5 
% Obs. correctly called 68.6 67.3 69.5 67.3 68.3 68.3 68.7 71.8 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. Hausman 
specification test suggested random effects with the Logit estimator. Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. Once we 
introduce the variable Seigniorage in our models (from specification [3]), we drop Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Gabon, Senegal, Sudan, Suriname, Syria and Zimbabwe from the sample due to outliers. The predictive power is calculated using a 
cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). 
 
Etudes et Documents n° 26, CERDI, 2013 
 
 33
Table 3.3.1: Likelihood of debt crises, with a constant number of observations 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Peg or float 0.513 0.446 0.497 0.504 0.141 0.135 0.184 0.222 
 (0.243) (0.320) (0.271) (0.267) (0.764) (0.773) (0.697) (0.644) 
Public debt  0.013** 0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.003 0.005 0.006 
  (0.022) (0.850) (0.862) (0.799) (0.799) (0.693) (0.634) 
Public debt squared   0.432 0.434 0.607 0.607 0.550 0.468 
   (0.269) (0.268) (0.110) (0.111) (0.136) (0.216) 
Inflation    0.062 0.051 0.050 0.049 0.041 
    (0.450) (0.505) (0.506) (0.522) (0.617) 
Growth     -0.223*** -0.223*** -0.224*** -0.211*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Executive constraint      -0.019 -0.018 -0.014 
      (0.874) (0.878) (0.907) 
Aid       -0.138** -0.146** 
       (0.027) (0.022) 
KA open        -0.377 
        (0.107) 
Obs. (countries) 517 (58) 517 (58) 517 (58) 517 (58) 517 (58) 517 (58) 517 (58) 517 (58) 
Pseudo-R² 0.228 0.234 0.233 0.234 0.225 0.222 0.212 0.214 
Wald-stat (Chi-2) 33.77 35.40 35.65 35.65 40.93 41.01 42.37 42.83 
Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood -168.0 -165.3 -164.7 -164.5 -158.0 -158.0 -155.2 -153.9 
% Obs. correctly called 88.1 86.8 86.2 86.6 85.4 85.8 82.7 82.7 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. Hausman 
specification test suggested random effects with the Logit estimator. Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. The predictive power 
is calculated using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). 
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Table 4: Likelihood of crises and contagion effects (Full Table) 
Banking crises Currency crises Debt crises 
Peg or float -0.260 -0.331 Peg or float 0.439 0.395 Peg or float 0.255 0.282 
 (0.337) (0.232)  (0.270) (0.328)  (0.593) (0.564) 
Currency crises 0.701**  Banking crises 0.523  Banking crises 1.231***  
 (0.016)   (0.175)   (0.004)  
Debt crises   1.015*** Debt crises   2.449*** Currency crises   2.017*** 
  (0.004)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Domestic credit 0.014** 0.015** Seigniorage 0.010** 0.012** Public debt 0.007 0.005 
 (0.025) (0.014)  (0.045) (0.020)  (0.561) (0.656) 
Volatility of DC 0.046** 0.046** FB -0.006 -0.013 Public debt squared 0.545 0.442 
 (0.018) (0.020)  (0.879) (0.712)  (0.151) (0.238) 
Size of the FS -0.424 -0.440 Domestic credit 0.016** 0.016** Inflation 0.051 0.046 
 (0.543) (0.538)  (0.047) (0.032)  (0.544) (0.568) 
Intermediation 0.001 0.001 Broad money -0.035 -0.044 Growth -0.194*** -0.202*** 
 (0.173) (0.186)  (0.276) (0.200)  (0.003) (0.002) 
CM regulation -0.141* -0.151* Growth  0.025 0.047 Executive constraint 0.027 -0.046 
 (0.095) (0.079)  (0.674) (0.437)  (0.823) (0.705) 
Growth -0.077* -0.066 Current account -0.009 -0.007 Aid -0.161** -0.135** 
 (0.056) (0.107)  (0.771) (0.826)  (0.012) (0.027) 
KA open -0.018 -0.048 KA open -0.788*** -0.691*** KA open -0.363 -0.201 
 (0.882) (0.699)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.117) (0.394) 
Obs. (countries) 691 (76) 691 (76) Obs. (countries) 485 (65) 485 (65) Obs. (countries) 517 (58) 517 (58) 
Pseudo-R² 0.018 0.025 Pseudo-R² 0.124 0.106 Pseudo-R² 0.196 0.157 
Wald-stat (Chi-2) 55.28 56.10 Wald-stat (Chi-2) 40.05 49.26 Wald-stat (Chi-2) 47.02 50.09 
Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.000 Wald (p-value) 0.002 0.000 Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood -281.0 -279.9 Log likelihood -197.6 -187.8 Log likelihood -149.7 -144.3 
% Obs. corr. called 77.8 77.7 % Obs. corr. called 70.8 76.1 % Obs. corr. called 83.9 85.1 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. Hausman specification test suggested random 
effects with the Logit estimator. All specifications include time dummies. Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. The 
predictive power is calculated using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). 
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Table 5.1: Likelihood of crises: Income level comparisons (Full Table) 
 Banking crises   Currency crises   Debt crises  
 LIC & LMIC UMIC HIC  LIC & LMIC UMIC HIC  LIC & LMIC  UMIC 
Peg or float -0.144 -1.797* 0.684 Peg or float 0.694 0.930 0.498 Peg or float 0.525 -0.818 
 (0.688) (0.063) (0.380)  (0.178) (0.472) (0.728)  (0.367) (0.482) 
Domestic credit 0.031** 0.081* 0.011 Seigniorage 0.002 0.029* 0.042** Public debt 0.006 0.050 
 (0.023) (0.088) (0.380)  (0.788) (0.057) (0.017)  (0.627) (0.526) 
Volatility of DC 0.054 0.116* 0.012 FB 0.069 -0.230* -0.106 Public debt squared 0.122 0.527 
 (0.175) (0.087) (0.732)  (0.194) (0.071) (0.221)  (0.791) (0.806) 
Size of the FS 0.756 -9.585* 0.215 Domestic credit 0.031** -0.003 -0.015 Inflation -0.012 0.316 
 (0.535) (0.098) (0.875)  (0.037) (0.898) (0.391)  (0.928) (0.601) 
Intermediation 0.001 -2.058 0.275 Broad money 0.080 -0.392** 0.041 Growth -0.287*** -0.118 
 (0.221) (0.243) (0.764)  (0.310) (0.042) (0.848)  (0.001) (0.504) 
CM regulation -0.077 -0.041 -0.204 Growth  -0.060 -0.316** 0.031 Executive constraint -0.066 -0.123 
 (0.473) (0.898) (0.380)  (0.278) (0.045) (0.451)  (0.662) (0.730) 
Growth -0.061 -0.096 -0.274*** Current account 0.051 -0.143 -0.200* Aid -0.133** -1.037* 
 (0.277) (0.452) (0.002)  (0.322) (0.105) (0.070)  (0.046) (0.061) 
KA open 0.100 0.510 -0.478 KA open -0.511* -0.581 -1.116*** KA open -0.036 -0.804* 
 (0.605) (0.153) (0.168)  (0.090) (0.164) (0.009)  (0.916) (0.100) 
Obs. (countries) 328 (38) 132 (14) 231 (24) Obs. (countries) 236 (33) 111 (13) 138 (19) Obs. (countries) 361 (41) 135 (14) 
Pseudo-R² 0.006 0.056 0.011 Pseudo-R² 0.076 0.134 0.000 Pseudo-R² 0.230 0.121 
Wald-stat (Chi-2) 28.86 9.666 26.29 Wald-stat (Chi-2) 22.70 14.33 20.38 Wald-stat (Chi-2) 24.13 12.49 
Wald (p-value) 0.0358 0.917 0.0693 Wald (p-value) 0.159 0.644 0.255 Wald (p-value) 0.116 0.769 
Log likelihood -134.8 -46.56 -69.14 Log likelihood -96.20 -36.23 -29.30 Log likelihood -100.4 -32.50 
% Obs. corr. called 54.7 67.7 70.4 % Obs. corr. called 61.9 60.6 53.1 % Obs. corr. called 82.2 80.2 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. Hausman specification test suggested random effects with the Logit 
estimator. Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. The predictive power is calculated using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). 
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Table 5.2: Likelihood of crises: Period comparisons (Full Table) 
 Banking crises  Currency crises  Debt crises 
 Before 1990 After 1990  Before 1990 After 1990  Before 1990 After 1990 
Peg or float -0.325 -0.410 Peg or float 0.443 -0.561 Peg or float -1.088 0.693 
 (0.448) (0.320)  (0.403) (0.495)  (0.220) (0.303) 
Domestic credit 0.012 0.021** Seigniorage 0.010 0.009 Public debt -0.010 0.033* 
 (0.423) (0.013)  (0.129) (0.381)  (0.744) (0.092) 
Volatility of DC 0.124** 0.033 FB -0.020 -0.018 Public debt squared 1.172 -0.200 
 (0.011) (0.219)  (0.650) (0.832)  (0.313) (0.679) 
Size of the FS -2.653* -0.179 Domestic credit 0.011 0.022 Inflation -0.012 1.475 
 (0.079) (0.855)  (0.194) (0.385)  (0.944) (0.380) 
Intermediation -0.009 0.001* Brod money -0.017 -0.176* Growth -0.420*** -0.107 
 (0.893) (0.064)  (0.631) (0.098)  (0.004) (0.220) 
CM regulation -0.112 -0.285* Growth -0.031 0.095 Executive constraint -0.267 0.129 
 (0.334) (0.070)  (0.714) (0.432)  (0.345) (0.388) 
Growth -0.013 -0.094 Current account -0.021 0.022 Aid  -0.159 -0.236** 
 (0.814) (0.180)  (0.629) (0.737)  (0.180) (0.012) 
KA open -0.151 -0.056 KA open -0.448** -1.838*** KA open -0.110 -0.639* 
 (0.434) (0.766)   (0.044) (0.001)  (0.778) (0.076) 
Obs. (countries) 254 (69) 437 (76) Obs. (countries) 294 (65) 191 (60) Obs. (countries) 320 (58) 197 (53) 
Pseudo-R² 0.014 0.050 Pseudo-R² 0.090 0.157 Pseudo-R² 0.309 0.111 
Wald-stat (Chi-2) 14.06 37.94 Wald-stat (Chi-2) 14.09 17.81 Wald-stat (Chi-2) 15.43 12.43 
Wald (p-value) 0.230 0.000 Wald (p-value) 0.367 0.0861 Wald (p-value) 0.281 0.332 
Log likelihood -117.5 -156.7 Log likelihood -116.3 -81.67 Log likelihood -62.18 -84.55 
% Obs. corr. called 78.0 79.1 % Obs. corr. called 64.3 72.0 % Obs. corr. called 70.4 83.1 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. Hausman specification test suggested random effects with 
the Logit estimator. Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. The predictive power is calculated using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). 
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Table 6.1: Likelihood of crises: Alternative binary estimation methods (Full Table) 
 Banking crises  Currency crises   Debt crises  
 Logit FE Probit  Logit FE Probit  Logit FE Probit 
Peg or float  -0.115 -0.166 Peg or float  0.710 0.232 Peg or float  0.598 0.117 
 (0.733) (0.295)  (0.128) (0.311)  (0.308) (0.658) 
Domestic credit 0.030*** 0.009** Seigniorage 0.013** 0.006** Public debt 0.020 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.018)  (0.018) (0.047)  (0.272) (0.654) 
Volatility of DC 0.040 0.028** FB -0.028 -0.005 Public debt squared 0.083 0.247 
 (0.177) (0.019)  (0.565) (0.802)  (0.871) (0.240) 
Size of the FS 0.225 -0.307 Domestic credit 0.052*** 0.010** Inflation 0.361 0.023 
 (0.845) (0.466)  (0.000) (0.020)  (0.359) (0.637) 
Intermediation 0.002 0.000* Brod money -0.051 -0.020 Growth -0.187** -0.116*** 
 (0.319) (0.092)  (0.325) (0.276)  (0.013) (0.001) 
CM regulation -0.115 -0.102** Growth 0.065 0.011 Executive constraint 0.025 -0.015 
 (0.380) (0.041)  (0.335) (0.754)  (0.853) (0.818) 
Growth -0.113** -0.049** Current account 0.013 -0.008 Aid  -0.129 -0.082** 
 (0.018) (0.039)  (0.743) (0.671)  (0.142) (0.020) 
KA open 0.234 -0.019 KA open -0.541** -0.447*** KA open -0.481 -0.209 
 (0.204) (0.793)  (0.026) (0.000)  (0.120) (0.109) 
Obs. (countries) 516 (54) 691 (76) Obs. (countries) 339 (44) 485 (65) Obs. (countries) 262 (27) 517 (58) 
Pseudo-R² 0.198 0.038 Pseudo-R² 0.362 0.150 Pseudo-R² 0.344 0.218 
Wald-stat (Chi-2) 76.10 52.76 Wald-stat (Chi-2) 92.61 43.16 Wald-stat (Chi-2) 68.66 46.55 
Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.000 Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.000 Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood -154.5 -283.2 Log likelihood -81.54 -198.3 Log likelihood -65.49 -153.5 
% Obs. corr. called 35.8 76.9 % Obs. corr. called 36.5 70.1 % Obs. corr. called 43.3 81.6 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. 
Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. The Probit models are estimated with random effects. The predictive power is 
calculated using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). 
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Table 6.2: Likelihood of crises: OLS estimations (Full Table) 
 Banking crises  Currency crises  Debt crises  
 Pooled FE RE  Pooled FE RE  Pooled FE RE 
Peg or float  -0.047 -0.008 -0.036 Peg or float  0.008 0.035 0.021 Peg or float  0.009 0.018 0.014 
 (0.137) (0.837) (0.276)  (0.849) (0.463) (0.629)  (0.782) (0.627) (0.668) 
Domestic credit 0.001** 0.003*** 0.002** Seigniorage 0.001 0.001** 0.001* Public debt 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.046) (0.000) (0.018)  (0.146) (0.045) (0.051)  (0.753) (0.409) (0.608) 
Volatility of DC 0.008*** 0.005* 0.007*** FB -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 Public debt squared 0.038 0.026 0.035 
 (0.003) (0.061) (0.005)  (0.569) (0.909) (0.797)  (0.135) (0.405) (0.187) 
Size of the FS -0.031 -0.024 -0.059 Domestic credit 0.001 0.004*** 0.002*** Inflation -0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.687) (0.855) (0.493)  (0.199) (0.000) (0.006)  (0.941) (0.731) (0.831) 
Intermediation 0.000** 0.000 0.000** Brod money -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 Growth -0.021*** -0.013*** -0.015*** 
 (0.016) (0.159) (0.029)  (0.266) (0.531) (0.325)  (0.000) (0.009) (0.001) 
CM regulation -0.022** -0.005 -0.021** Growth -0.002 0.004 0.001 Executive constraint 0.008 -0.011 -0.002 
 (0.021) (0.748) (0.046)  (0.744) (0.567) (0.879)  (0.309) (0.256) (0.852) 
Growth -0.007 -0.011** -0.008* Current account 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 Aid  -0.009*** -0.006 -0.008*** 
 (0.158) (0.035) (0.087)  (0.545) (0.884) (0.737)  (0.001) (0.139) (0.010) 
KA open -0.013 0.003 -0.012 KA open -0.080*** -0.072*** -0.087*** KA open -0.021 -0.044** -0.033** 
 (0.289) (0.854) (0.367)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.112) (0.013) (0.023) 
Obs. (countries) 691 691 (76) 691 (76) Obs. (countries) 485 485 (65) 485 (65) Obs. (countries) 517 517 (58) 517 (58) 
R-squared 0.101 0.113 0.0998 R-squared 0.144 0.187 0.132 R-squared 0.128 0.148 0.118 
Fischer-stat 4.447 4.469  Fischer-stat 4.615 5.457  Fischer-stat 4.294 4.500  
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000)  (p-value) (0.000) (0.000)  (p-value) (0.000) (0.000)  
Wald-stat   75.66 Wald-stat   89.93 Wald-stat   78.31 
(p-value)   (0.000) (p-value)   (0.000) (p-value)   (0.000) 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. 
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Table 7: Pair comparison of the likelihood of crises (Full Table) 
 Banking crises   Currency crises  Debt crises 
 [1] [2] [3]  [4] [5] [6]  [7] [8] [9] 
Peg  -0.143  -0.068 Peg  -0.298  -0.340 Peg  -0.150  0.174 
 (0.686)  (0.847)  (0.584)  (0.497)  (0.791)  (0.763) 
Float  -0.399 -0.487 Float  0.721 0.991** Float  0.183 0.118 
  (0.274) (0.167)   (0.173) (0.045)   (0.815) (0.849) 
Domestic credit 0.013 0.016** 0.016** Seigniorage 0.009 0.009 0.010** Public debt 0.015 -0.013 0.006 
 (0.103) (0.021) (0.014)  (0.148) (0.140) (0.045)  (0.330) (0.464) (0.630) 
Volatility of DC 0.047* 0.041* 0.048** FB -0.023 -0.022 -0.010 Public debt squared 0.184 1.556** 0.470 
 (0.051) (0.063) (0.018)  (0.597) (0.625) (0.790)  (0.685) (0.021) (0.215) 
Size of the FS -1.002 -0.662 -0.430 Domestic credit 0.018 0.016* 0.015* Inflation 0.030 4.132* 0.041 
 (0.288) (0.420) (0.568)  (0.175) (0.079) (0.062)  (0.747) (0.074) (0.618) 
Intermediation 0.001 0.000 0.001* Brod money -0.062 -0.047 -0.036 Growth -0.196*** -0.270** -0.213*** 
 (0.222) (0.432) (0.094)  (0.254) (0.267) (0.275)  (0.005) (0.014) (0.001) 
CM regulation -0.065 -0.147 -0.163* Growth -0.021 0.003 0.019 Executive constraint 0.091 -0.055 -0.013 
 (0.494) (0.151) (0.068)  (0.764) (0.972) (0.754)  (0.465) (0.727) (0.910) 
Growth -0.090** -0.073 -0.083** Current account -0.004 -0.046 -0.013 Aid  -0.114* -0.109 -0.146** 
 (0.041) (0.141) (0.044)  (0.920) (0.277) (0.699)  (0.091) (0.174) (0.022) 
KA open -0.137 -0.112 -0.054 KA open -0.935*** -0.919*** -0.826*** KA open -0.339 -0.135 -0.373 
 (0.341) (0.446) (0.672)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.181) (0.677) (0.111) 
Obs. (countries) 491 (70) 505 (63) 691 (76) Obs. (countries) 347 (59) 357 (55) 485 (65) Obs. (countries) 402 (57) 334 (46) 517 (58) 
Pseudo R 0.020 0.041 0.039 Pseudo R 0.122 0.154 0.137 Pseudo R 0.196 0.180 0.213 
Wald (stat) 28.69 37.75 48.43 Wald (stat) 33.39 29.93 40.64 Wald (stat) 29.63 23.38 42.95 
Wald (p-value) 0.037 0.002 0.000 Wald (p-value) 0.010 0.026 0.001 Wald (p-value) 0.029 0.137 0.000 
Log likelihood -219.5 -215.0 -283.2 Log likelihood -143.6 -146.0 -195.9 Log likelihood -131.9 -96.01 -153.9 
Test 1 [Peg]=[Float]   0.99 Test 1 [Peg]=[Float]   5.21 Test 1 [Peg]=[Float]   0.01 
Chi-2 (p-value)   0.319 Chi-2 (p-value)   0.022 Chi-2 (p-value)   0.936 
Test 2 [Peg]=[Float]=0   1.96 Test 2 [Peg]=[Float]=0   5.90 Test 2 [Peg]=[Float]=0   0.10 
Chi-2 (p-value)   0.376 Chi-2 (p-value)   0.052 Chi-2 (p-value)   0.950 
% Obs. corr. called 73.3 73.6 78.0 % Obs. corr. called 71.2 65.5 72.0 % Obs. corr. called 81.8 83.8 82.3 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. Hausman specification test suggested random effects with the Logit estimator. 
Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. The predictive power is calculated using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). 
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Table 9.1: Alternative definitions of the ERR variable: banking crises (Full Table) 
 [1] [2] [3] LIC & LMIC UMIC HIC 
Peg or float1 -0.308   -0.517 -1.949 1.422* 
 (0.395)   (0.268) (0.100) (0.097) 
Peg or float2  -0.162     
  (0.705)     
Peg or float3   -0.175    
   (0.693)    
Domestic credit 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.033** 0.024 0.013 
 (0.133) (0.129) (0.104) (0.041) (0.529) (0.308) 
Volatility of DC 0.037* 0.031 0.036 0.042 0.201 0.004 
 (0.092) (0.160) (0.115) (0.325) (0.110) (0.897) 
Size of the FS -0.267 -0.623 -0.597 1.096 -8.172* -0.313 
 (0.721) (0.436) (0.461) (0.408) (0.098) (0.828) 
Intermediation -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -2.009 0.031 
 (0.852) (0.841) (0.802) (0.702) (0.203) (0.975) 
CM regulation -0.063 -0.036 -0.061 0.086 0.295 -0.199 
 (0.522) (0.734) (0.567) (0.550) (0.348) (0.419) 
Growth -0.078* -0.088* -0.090* -0.065 -0.217* -0.271*** 
 (0.082) (0.072) (0.069) (0.360) (0.099) (0.004) 
KA open 0.008 -0.048 -0.069 0.287 0.655* -0.409 
 (0.956) (0.743) (0.641) (0.164) (0.078) (0.265) 
Obs. (countries) 528 (74) 439 (65) 435 (65) 221 (36) 102 (14) 205 (24) 
Pseudo-R² 0.024 0.029 0.029 0.000 0.047 0.014 
Wald (stat) 32.43 28.24 29.22 22.80 8.921 24.53 
Wald (p-value) 0.0133 0.0422 0.0326 0.156 0.943 0.106 
Log likelihood -228.1 -200.2 -195.7 -88.09 -36.99 -64.64 
% Obs. correctly called 72.3 70.6 70.8 50.9 68.5 69.3 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. Hausman 
specification test suggested random effects with the Logit estimator. Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. The 
predictive power is calculated using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). 
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Table 9.1.1: Alternative definitions of the ERR variable and the level of economic 
development: banking crises (completes Table 9.1) 
 LIC & LMIC UMIC HIC 
Peg or float1 -0.517   -1.949*   1.422*   
 (0.268)   (0.100)   (0.097)   
Peg or float2  -0.201   -0.904   1.356  
  (0.777)   (0.450)   (0.146)  
Peg or float3   -0.201   -0.571   1.356 
   (0.777)   (0.673)   (0.146) 
Domestic credit 0.033** 0.031* 0.031* 0.024 0.013 -0.017 0.013 0.017 0.017 
 (0.041) (0.079) (0.079) (0.529) (0.725) (0.714) (0.308) (0.228) (0.228) 
Volatility of DC 0.042 0.033 0.033 0.201 0.200 0.436* 0.004 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.325) (0.447) (0.447) (0.110) (0.114) (0.068) (0.897) (0.804) (0.804) 
Size of the FS 1.096 0.685 0.685 -8.172* -6.968 -4.925 -0.313 -0.444 -0.444 
 (0.408) (0.629) (0.629) (0.098) (0.135) (0.326) (0.828) (0.763) (0.763) 
Intermediation -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -2.009 -1.994 -1.000 0.031 0.422 0.422 
 (0.702) (0.832) (0.832) (0.203) (0.204) (0.550) (0.975) (0.674) (0.674) 
CM regulation 0.086 0.156 0.156 0.295 0.049 -0.151 -0.199 -0.167 -0.167 
 (0.550) (0.317) (0.317) (0.348) (0.874) (0.645) (0.419) (0.523) (0.523) 
Growth -0.065 -0.062 -0.062 -0.217* -0.215* -0.246* -0.271*** -0.305*** -0.305*** 
 (0.360) (0.441) (0.441) (0.099) (0.083) (0.086) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
KA open 0.287 0.261 0.261 0.655* 0.574 0.383 -0.409 -0.485 -0.485 
 (0.164) (0.218) (0.218) (0.078) (0.106) (0.281) (0.265) (0.236) (0.236) 
Obs. (countries) 221 (36) 168 (29) 168 (29) 102 (14) 92 (13) 88 (13) 205 (24) 179 (23) 179 (23) 
Pseudo-R² 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.047 0.014 0.007 0.014 0.011 0.011 
Wald-stat (Chi-2) 22.80 18.61 18.61 8.921 9.185 9.769 24.53 22.35 22.35 
Wald (p-value) 0.156 0.351 0.351 0.943 0.934 0.913 0.106 0.172 0.172 
Log likelihood -88.09 -73.88 -73.88 -36.99 -35.26 -30.37 -64.64 -56.70 -56.70 
% Obs. correctly called 50.9 46.0 45.9 68.5 63.4 65.2 69.3 72.8 73.3 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. Hausman 
specification test suggested random effects with the Logit estimator. Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. The predictive 
power is calculated using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). 
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Table 9.2: Alternative definitions of the ERR variable: currency crises (Full Table) 
 [1] [2] [3] LIC & LMIC UMIC HIC 
Peg or float1 -0.066   0.504 -2.451 1.134 
 (0.918)   (0.571) (0.701) (0.442) 
Peg or float2  0.165     
  (0.823)     
Peg or float3   0.265    
   (0.736)    
Seigniorage 0.016** 0.014* 0.015* 0.010 0.039 0.047**  
 (0.017) (0.058) (0.058) (0.292) (0.419) (0.036) 
FB -0.050 -0.059 -0.046 0.029 -0.819 -0.112 
 (0.276) (0.237) (0.356) (0.661) (0.109) (0.198) 
Domestic credit 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.033 0.291 -0.015 
 (0.112) (0.184) (0.195) (0.147) (0.106) (0.357) 
Brod money -0.020 -0.017 -0.015 -0.054 -0.571 0.034 
 (0.600) (0.685) (0.725) (0.497) (0.421) (0.405) 
Growth -0.036 -0.046 -0.005 0.021 -2.522** 0.038 
 (0.652) (0.608) (0.960) (0.857) (0.048) (0.860) 
Current account -0.007 -0.033 -0.028 0.092 -1.040 -0.195* 
 (0.846) (0.437) (0.523) (0.164) (0.150) (0.076) 
KA open -0.683*** -0.793*** -0.843*** -0.303 -1.817 -1.125*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.463) (0.365) (0.009) 
Obs. (countries) 360 (62) 324 (57) 320 (57) 157 (31) 75 (11) 120 (18) 
Pseudo-R² 0.153 0.164 0.172 0.050 0.155 0.000 
Wald (stat) 27.84  27.05 12.00 14.85 17.97 
Wald (p-value) 0.0468  0.0574 0.800 0.606 0.391 
Log likelihood -142.8 -128.4 -124.3 -60.96 -18.79 -28.33 
% Obs. correctly called 72.8 71.6 73.1 58.1 55.9 62.8 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. 
Hausman specification test suggested random effects with the Logit estimator. Coefficients displayed are marginal 
effects. The predictive power is calculated using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). 
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Table 9.2.1: Alternative definitions of the ERR variable and the level of economic 
development: currency crises (completes Table 9.2) 
 LIC & LMIC UMIC HIC 
Peg or float1 0.504   -2.451   1.134   
 (0.571)   (0.701)   (0.442)   
Peg or float2  1.871   -2.451   1.134  
  (0.158)   (0.701)   (0.442)  
Peg or float3   1.871   -1.751   1.134 
   (0.158)   (0.717)   (0.442) 
Seigniorage 0.010 0.006 0.006 0.039 0.039 0.049 0.047** 0.047** 0.047** 
 (0.292) (0.611) (0.611) (0.419) (0.419) (0.343) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
FB 0.029 0.030 0.030 -0.819 -0.819 -0.370 -0.112 -0.112 -0.112 
 (0.661) (0.693) (0.693) (0.109) (0.109) (0.285) (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) 
Domestic credit 0.033 0.034 0.034 0.291 0.291 0.167 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 
 (0.147) (0.256) (0.256) (0.106) (0.106) (0.249) (0.357) (0.357) (0.357) 
Broad money -0.054 -0.131 -0.131 -0.571 -0.571 -0.591 0.034 0.034 0.034 
 (0.497) (0.358) (0.358) (0.421) (0.421) (0.219) (0.405) (0.405) (0.405) 
Growth  0.021 0.063 0.063 -2.522** -2.522** -1.502 0.038 0.038 0.038 
 (0.857) (0.666) (0.666) (0.048) (0.048) (0.136) (0.860) (0.860) (0.860) 
Current account 0.092 0.034 0.034 -1.040 -1.040 -0.822* -0.195* -0.195* -0.195* 
 (0.164) (0.653) (0.653) (0.150) (0.150) (0.082) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) 
KA open -0.303 -0.721 -0.721 -1.817 -1.817 -0.016 -1.125*** -1.125*** -1.125*** 
 (0.463) (0.192) (0.192) (0.365) (0.365) (0.994) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Obs. (countries) 157 (31) 124 (26) 124 (26) 75 (11) 75 (11) 71 (11) 120 (18) 117 (18) 117 (18) 
Pseudo-R² 0.050 0.072 0.072 0.155 0.155 0.216 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wald-stat (Chi-2) 12.00 9.940 9.940 14.85 14.85 . 17.97 17.97 17.97 
Wald (p-value) 0.800 0.906 0.906 0.606 0.606 . 0.391 0.391 0.391 
Log likelihood -60.96 -48.62 -48.62 -18.79 -18.79 -16.24 -28.33 -28.33 -28.33 
% Obs. correctly called 51.8 61.8 62.0 55.9 55.0 54.6 62.8 66.1 66.6 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. Hausman specification 
test suggested random effects with the Logit estimator. Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. The predictive power is calculated 
using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). 
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Table 9.3: Alternative definitions of the ERR variable: debt crises (Full Table) 
 [1] [2] [3] LIC & LMIC UMIC 
Peg or float1 -0.457   -0.036 -1.074 
 (0.527)   (0.972) (0.379) 
Peg or float2  -0.678    
  (0.452)    
Peg or float3   -0.774   
   (0.413)   
Public debt 0.013 0.011 0.007 0.025 0.060 
 (0.470) (0.598) (0.719) (0.295) (0.504) 
Public debt squared 0.360 0.693 0.707 -0.328 0.013 
 (0.497) (0.275) (0.253) (0.692) (0.995) 
Inflation 0.025 -0.616 3.427* -0.029 0.151 
 (0.823) (0.488) (0.090) (0.894) (0.772) 
Growth -0.161** -0.163* -0.157* -0.232* -0.127 
 (0.036) (0.078) (0.097) (0.062) (0.472) 
Executive constraint 0.079 0.100 0.061 0.147 -0.188 
 (0.573) (0.521) (0.693) (0.454) (0.590) 
Aid  -0.126* -0.100 -0.100 -0.130 -0.678 
 (0.083) (0.232) (0.222) (0.155) (0.132) 
KA open -0.205 -0.199 -0.100 0.134 -0.623* 
 (0.434) (0.515) (0.737) (0.771) (0.094) 
Obs. (countries) 373 (56) 303 (48) 299 (48) 245 (39) 108 (14) 
Pseudo-R² 0.123 0.161 0.140 0.124 0.011 
Wald (stat) 29.59 26.61 26.07 13.68 9.086 
Wald (p-value) 0.0295 0.0640 0.0731 0.690 0.938 
Log likelihood -114.5 -96.39 -93.56 -66.05 -27.82 
% Obs. correctly called 84.7 82.8 83.6 83.6 78.5 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications 
include time dummies. Hausman specification test suggested random effects with the Logit 
estimator. Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. No debt crises for HIC during the period of 
our analysis. The predictive power is calculated using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). 
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Table 9.3.1: Alternative definitions of the ERR variable and the level of economic 
development: debt crises (completes Table 9.3) 
 LIC & LMIC  UMIC 
Peg or float1 -0.036   -1.074   
 (0.972)   (0.379)   
Peg or float2  -0.097   -1.923  
  (0.940)   (0.293)  
Peg or float3   -0.097   -4.092 
   (0.940)   (0.122) 
Public debt 0.025 0.015 0.015 0.060 0.129 0.341 
 (0.295) (0.565) (0.565) (0.504) (0.375) (0.273) 
Public debt squared -0.328 0.247 0.247 0.013 -0.002 -2.207 
 (0.692) (0.789) (0.789) (0.995) (0.999) (0.727) 
Inflation -0.029 2.698 2.698 0.151 -0.785 38.579** 
 (0.894) (0.376) (0.376) (0.772) (0.480) (0.021) 
Growth -0.232* -0.178 -0.178 -0.127 -0.241 -0.624* 
 (0.062) (0.234) (0.234) (0.472) (0.323) (0.078) 
Executive constraint 0.147 0.175 0.175 -0.188 0.161 -0.863 
 (0.454) (0.436) (0.436) (0.590) (0.776) (0.257) 
Aid -0.130 -0.113 -0.113 -0.678 -1.324 -1.357 
 (0.155) (0.255) (0.255) (0.132) (0.105) (0.190) 
KA open 0.134 0.094 0.094 -0.623* -0.988* 0.430 
 (0.771) (0.854) (0.854) (0.094) (0.087) (0.441) 
Obs. (countries) 245 (39) 185 (32) 185 (32) 108 (14) 98 (13) 94 (13) 
Pseudo-R² 0.124 0.154 0.154 0.011 0.042 0.000 
Wald-stat (Chi-2) 13.68 10.19 10.19 9.086 6.490 9.039 
Wald (p-value) 0.690 0.895 0.895 0.938 0.989 0.939 
Log likelihood -66.05 -54.73 -54.73 -27.82 -22.77 -10.24 
% Obs. correctly called 83.6 83.1 83.6 78.5 79.2 81.9 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications include time 
dummies. Hausman specification test suggested random effects with the Logit estimator. Coefficients 
displayed are marginal effects. No debt crises for HIC during the period of our analysis. The predictive 
power is calculated using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b).  
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Table 10.1: Alternative databases for crises and ERR: banking crises (Full Table) 
IMF classification  IRR classification 
 [1] [2] [3] [4]  [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Peg or float  0.125    Peg_or_float 0.030    
 (0.620)     (0.899)    
Peg or float1  0.326   Peg_or_float1  -0.018   
  (0.381)     (0.944)   
Peg or float2   0.298  Peg_or_float2   -0.072  
   (0.447)     (0.796)  
Peg or float3    0.344 Peg_or_float3    0.262 
    (0.407)     (0.439) 
Domestic credit 0.010** 0.006 0.006 0.007 Domestic credit 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 0.009 
 (0.038) (0.267) (0.293) (0.246)  (0.055) (0.086) (0.080) (0.122) 
Volatility of DC 0.045** 0.041* 0.037* 0.043* Volatility of DC 0.053** 0.052** 0.051** 0.053**  
 (0.017) (0.057) (0.086) (0.055)  (0.012) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) 
Size of the FS -0.665 -0.709 -0.782 -0.817 Size of the FS -0.601 -0.590 -0.607 -0.540 
 (0.236) (0.250) (0.241) (0.234)  (0.283) (0.360) (0.347) (0.406) 
Intermediation 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 Intermediation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.308) (0.374) (0.412) (0.379)  (0.714) (0.333) (0.317) (0.365) 
CM regulation -0.180** -0.083 -0.056 -0.085 CM regulation -0.176** -0.200** -0.202** -0.192**  
 (0.020) (0.402) (0.599) (0.433)  (0.021) (0.037) (0.036) (0.049) 
Growth -0.078* -0.105* -0.102* -0.108* Growth -0.074* -0.109** -0.110** -0.108**  
 (0.085) (0.067) (0.093) (0.086)  (0.098) (0.036) (0.034) (0.037) 
KA open -0.079 -0.039 -0.047 -0.060 KA open -0.081 -0.019 -0.017 -0.035 
  (0.412) (0.738) (0.702) (0.638)  (0.393) (0.858) (0.874) (0.741) 
Obs. (countries) 496 (53) 377 (53) 351 (52) 347 (52) Obs. (countries) 491 (53) 453 (53) 453 (53) 453 (53) 
Pseudo R 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 Pseudo R 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.003 
Wald (stat) 44.82 33.11 29.77 31.16 Wald (stat) 42.72 38.91 38.98 39.07 
Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.010 0.028 0.019 Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Log likelihood -267.8 -202.3 -191.9 -187.3 Log likelihood -262.9 -237.8 -237.8 -237.5 
% Obs. corr. called 59.4 57.2 57.2 58.2 % Obs. corr. called 59.4 61.5 61.1 61.5 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. Hausman specification test suggested 
random effects with the Logit estimator. Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. The IMF and IRR classifications of ERR lead to different definitions 
of corner ERR variables. The predictive power is calculated using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). 
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Table 10.2: Alternative databases for crises and ERR: currency crises (Full Table) 
IMF classification  IRR classification 
 [1] [2] [3] [4]  [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Peg or float  0.477    Peg_or_float -0.151    
 (0.200)     (0.686)    
Peg or float1  0.413   Peg_or_float1  0.104   
  (0.493)     (0.774)   
Peg or float2   0.428  Peg_or_float2   0.178  
   (0.476)     (0.649)  
Peg or float3    0.542 Peg_or_float3    -0.087 
    (0.398)     (0.870) 
Seigniorage 0.012** 0.013* 0.013* 0.013* Seigniorage 0.010* 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 (0.029) (0.059) (0.059) (0.055)  (0.063) (0.321) (0.323) (0.314) 
FB -0.033 -0.030 -0.030 -0.021 FB -0.031 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.338) (0.473) (0.472) (0.620)  (0.379) (0.953) (0.963) (0.918) 
Domestic credit 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.007 Domestic credit 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.003 
 (0.403) (0.387) (0.391) (0.387)  (0.332) (0.677) (0.693) (0.617) 
Brod money 0.002 0.015 0.015 0.017 Brod money 0.009 0.016 0.015 0.017 
 (0.891) (0.566) (0.574) (0.523)  (0.674) (0.445) (0.461) (0.437) 
Growth -0.049 -0.065 -0.061 -0.024 Growth -0.077 -0.100 -0.097 -0.101 
 (0.446) (0.439) (0.465) (0.785)  (0.224) (0.138) (0.152) (0.136) 
Current account 0.011 0.067 0.068 0.073 Current account 0.011 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.752) (0.153) (0.148) (0.137)  (0.757) (0.994) (0.993) (0.977) 
KA open -0.740*** -0.854*** -0.850*** -0.906*** KA open -0.752*** -0.658*** -0.655*** -0.658*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Obs. (countries) 353 (48) 266 (46) 263 (46) 259 (46) Obs. (countries) 350 (48) 310 (48) 310 (48) 310 (48) 
Pseudo R 0.037 0.056 0.055 0.061 Pseudo R 0.048 0.019 0.016 0.021 
Wald (stat) 49.50 37.38 36.60 35.73 Wald (stat) 49.01 38.68 39.02 38.30 
Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.004 Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 
Log likelihood -178.1 -130.0 -129.9 -126.0 Log likelihood -175.3 -158.4 -158.4 -158.5 
% Obs corr. called 65.7 65.7 65.0 66.0 % Obs corr. called 66.8 64.8 64.8 65.8 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. Hausman specification test suggested 
random effects with the Logit estimator. Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. The IMF and IRR classifications of ERR lead to different definitions 
of corner ERR variables. The predictive power is calculated using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). 
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Table 10.3: Alternative databases for crises and ERR: debt crises (Full Table) 
IMF classification  IRR classification 
 [1] [2] [3] [4]  [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Peg or float  0.115    Peg_or_float -0.345    
 (0.807)     (0.485)    
Peg or float1  -1.371   Peg_or_float1  -0.430   
  (0.123)     (0.465)   
Peg or float2   -1.371  Peg_or_float2   -0.755  
   (0.123)     (0.240)  
Peg or float3    -1.441 Peg_or_float3    -0.889 
    (0.121)     (0.237) 
Public debt -0.000 0.006 0.006 0.006 Public debt -0.002 0.014 0.015 0.016 
 (0.982) (0.808) (0.808) (0.807)  (0.920) (0.561) (0.564) (0.512) 
Public debt squared 0.953** 1.314 1.314 1.237 Public debt squared 1.021** 0.837 0.857 0.756 
 (0.043) (0.116) (0.116) (0.131)  (0.038) (0.271) (0.269) (0.318) 
Inflation 0.155 -1.204 -1.204 -0.123 Inflation 0.096 -0.004 -0.065 -0.047 
 (0.784) (0.332) (0.332) (0.961)  (0.858) (0.994) (0.902) (0.926) 
Growth -0.336*** -0.257** -0.257** -0.248** Growth -0.306*** -0.288*** -0.307*** -0.296*** 
 (0.000) (0.032) (0.032) (0.037)  (0.000) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Executive constraint -0.052 -0.053 -0.053 -0.052 Executive constraint -0.022 -0.137 -0.150 -0.127 
 (0.659) (0.752) (0.752) (0.748)  (0.854) (0.338) (0.306) (0.375) 
Aid  -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.002 Aid  -0.006 0.085 0.088 0.086 
 (0.961) (0.996) (0.996) (0.986)  (0.929) (0.341) (0.339) (0.347) 
KA open 0.019 0.133 0.133 0.174 KA open 0.028 -0.012 -0.024 0.047 
  (0.927) (0.640) (0.640) (0.535)  (0.895) (0.956) (0.917) (0.838) 
Obs. (countries) 313 (34) 211 (34) 211 (34) 207 (34) Obs. (countries) 310 (34) 262 (34) 262 (34) 262 (34) 
Pseudo R 0.100 0.099 0.099 0.089 Pseudo R 0.109 0.089 0.094 0.095 
Wald (stat) 51.56 32.26 32.26 31.22 Wald (stat) 50.97 38.76 38.67 39.09 
Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.014 0.014 0.018 Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Log likelihood -133.8 -91.04 -91.04 -90.13 Log likelihood -131.6 -105.2 -104.7 -104.7 
% Obs. corr. called 72.5 73.9 73.9 72.4 % Obs. corr. called 71.9 74.8 73.6 73.2 
Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. Hausman specification test suggested random 
effects with the Logit estimator. Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. The IMF and IRR classifications of ERR lead to different definitions of corner ERR 
variables. The predictive power is calculated using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b).  
